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ABSTRACT
The concepts of value and value stream are crucial to the philosophy of Lean, and a better
understanding of how these concepts relate to product development (PD) is essential for
the creation of a Lean PD strategy. This thesis focuses on value by looking at PD
processes through two different value perspectives: Product Development Value Stream
Mapping and Earned Value Management. Product Development Value Stream Maps
(PDVSMs) were created for two different PD projects, and the tasks from the maps were
analyzed for how they each create value. The official value measurement for the two
projects, Earned Value Management System data, was analyzed and compared to the
PDVSMs. This comparison of the two value perspectives proved valuable, as it showed
that despite some misalignments, they are congruent. The comparison also highlighted
several flaws in EVMS. Finally, a combined EVMS/PDVSM hybrid management tool is
proposed and discussed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As the concepts of Lean originally developed by Toyota after World War II have proven
to be powerful in improving efficiency in manufacturing systems, many have attempted
to apply them in other areas of business. From health care to office paperwork, the
overarching philosophy of Lean-eliminating waste and creating value-has proven
useful for allowing organizations to do more with less. In this age of reduced defense
budgets, the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) at MIT has set out to help the US aerospace
industry transform to a more Lean state. This is a slow process, and many of the
specifics of how to make this transition are still to be uncovered.
In order for industrial firms to truly be Lean enterprises, the lessons from Lean
manufacturing must be transferred both upstream and downstream to make the value flow
continuously from raw materials and ideas into products customers want. In the upstream
processes, market identification and product development (PD), more impact can be
made on the final outcome of the value flow than can be in manufacturing or testing. In
spite of the huge potential of PD, industry research indicates that for it is rarely executed
optimally. A typical aerospace work package in the product development process is
either idle or having non-value adding work performed on it 77% of the time (McManus
2004). Thus, PD is ripe for the implementation of Lean, but with its long batch times,
uncertain processes, iterations, intangible products, and non-linear flow, PD seems to be
too far removed from manufacturing for Lean to apply. In order to understand how Lean
can help improve PD, many areas must be explored.
1.2 Problem Statement
With this thesis, I aim to help make Lean more practical within complex product
development. I am attempting to discover if creating a Product Development Value
Stream Map (PDVSM) is effective for learning about a PD process. I seek to learn
whether a PDVSM helps to identify value and its flow and to better understand how
value is created in the product development process. I also want to know how well a
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current system used for measuring value, the Earned Value Management System
(EVMS), compares to a PDVSM and associated value analysis.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis describes two case studies carried out at a LAI member company, referred to
as "Company X". One project involved the development of requirements for a software
subsystem, and the other dealt with a hardware prototype within a spiral development
process. For each project, its context, process, and issues are explained, and one or more
PDVSM is presented. The process steps of these maps were analyzed for the kinds of
value they created within the project. Data from the project's official measures of value,
EVMS, are analyzed and compared to the PDVSM and value analysis. Interesting points
and disconnects between these two perspectives on PD value were identified and
examined.
In the following chapter, the major concepts of Lean are presented with a discussion of
the product development process, some problems endemic to PD, and research into the
implementing Lean in PD. The third chapter gives a little background about LAI and the
general research strategy of the LAI Product Development group, along with the specific
strategy for this thesis research. After that, a chapter for each of the projects studied form
the heart of this thesis. The sixth chapter collects the research findings, lessons learned
about performing this type of research, and direction for future research.
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2 Background
The following chapter offers a brief introduction to the concepts of Lean and product
development, as well as prior attempts to join the two. It concludes with a short
explanation of the Earned Value Management System, which played a large part of this
thesis.
2.1 Lean
In short, Lean is an overarching philosophy of creating value in an efficient manner and
eliminating waste. It can be applied to various parts of business to achieve unimaginable
gains in productivity that can help businesses thrive. Any attempt to fully explain both
the simplicity and intricacies that create this powerful system of thought in a few pages
will be woefully inadequate. A great deal of literature exists that does a much better job
of explaining Lean, and a taste of this follows.
The core concepts of Lean were first brought to attention in the 1990 book The Machine
That Changed the World (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990), based upon research done by
the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program. In their book, Womack, Jones, and Roos
chronicle the rise of Lean production at the Toyota Motor Corporation in the decades
after World War II and describe the unprecedented efficiency it enables. Of course,
Toyota did not refer to these concepts as "Lean" but merely as the "Toyota Production
System" (TPS), which had evolved due to lack of resources and labor in the post-war
manufacturing environment. The standard practices of mass production could not be
used, and Toyota had to be creative in finding a new way to do more with less. While the
Toyota Production System was bolstered by many cultural influences and by ideas from
hundreds of employees, Shigeo Shingo and Taiichi Ohno had the greatest influence on it.
They are considered the fathers of TPS.
In their successful 1996 follow-up Lean Thinking, Womack and Jones sought a way to
help the success of Lean within a production environment to be extended to an enterprise
level. They defined five principles that were key to Lean production's success: value, the
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value stream, flow, pull, and perfection. These principles are thought to be applicable
outside of production, and this has been the goal of much research (Womack and Jones,
1996).
They define the "value" of a product or service as "a capability provided to a customer at
the right time at an appropriate price, as defined in each case by the customer" (Womack
and Jones, 1996, p. 353). In other words, the value of a product is how much it is worth
to the customer to have the product where and when they want it and at what level of
quality. By focusing on customer value (and thus what the customer is willing to pay
for), an enterprise can eliminate all activities that do not contribute to its creation (those
the customer isn't willing to pay for), and thereby save time and money. All of Lean is
based upon delivering customer value.
The "value stream" is "all the actions, both value added and non-value added, currently
required to bring a product from raw material to the arms of the customer or through the
design flow from concept to launch." (Morgan, 2002) The value stream often
encompass many business enterprises (such as designers, suppliers, and final assemblers),
and by looking at the entire value stream, one can identify how to improve the process of
turning an idea into a product. According to Womack and Jones, in analyzing value
streams, all activities will fall into one of three types:
Value adding: Contributes to the value of the product
Necessary, but non value adding: Cannot be avoided
Non value adding: Should be eliminated immediately; waste.
To understand these activities, let's think about painting a new car. Paint protects the
frame and body of a car from the elements, and provides aesthetic appeal to most car
owners. While some customers may insist that they do not care about the paint job on
their car, most people find the color to be an important consideration when purchasing an
automobile. Whether for the aesthetic or the protective purpose, each customer gets
value from having paint on their car. Thus, the act of applying paint to the car inherently
adds value to the product, and thus is a value-adding activity. After a while, all paint-
spraying equipment tends to get clogged if not routinely cleaned and maintained. Thus,
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cleaning the sprayer is an activity that does not contribute value directly to a product, but
is necessary for the painting system that in turn adds value to many vehicles; it is
necessary non value added. Many small tasks may be associated with the painting job
which are not really needed. Perhaps the paint arrives from the paint manufacturer in
large drums that must then be poured into smaller containers that can be inserted into the
painting system. If the automobile manufacturer were able to coordinate with its paint
supplier to deliver the paint in smaller containers that fit easily into the painting
equipment, the non value added task of pouring the paint into a new container could be
avoided.
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Figure 2. 1. Sample Learning To See Value Stream Map (Millard, 2001)
One of the best ways to visualize and analyze the value stream of a process is to create a
value stream map (VSM). Value stream mapping is a technique for drawing the value
stream that allows one to see the flow of information and materials between activities.
The fundamental strategy of using a value stream map involves first creating a map that
reflects the current state of the process being mapped. This map is then analyzed for
waste and value creation, and a future-state map is created, which represents how the
process could and should operate. An improvement plan can then be created to enable
the transformation from the current state to the future state. As the process is improved
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over time, the current state can be mapped again, and compared with the future state map
again to redefine the improvement strategy. Value stream mapping has proven to be
incredibly valuable in the world of manufacturing. The mapping format and techniques
developed by Rother and Shook (1999) in their Learning to See have proven to be useful
for identifying waste and enabling process improvement. A sample of a Learning to See
map is shown above in Figure 2.4
Once the value of a product has been assessed, and its value stream analyzed, focus
should be applied to making the steps in the product creation processflow smoothly.
That is to say that the output from one process task should move smoothly into the next
task. When flow is not achieved, parts and information to be processed pile up as
inventory in between tasks. In a manufacturing environment, these parts take up space
and must be kept in order for when they will be processed. This piling up of inventory is
but one of many kinds of impediment to flow known as waste. Ohno identified seven
kinds of production waste, and Womack and Jones added one more (Womack and Jones,
1996). These will be further explored later.
Lean is not the first system to recognize the value of flow, as Henry Ford employed the
continuous flow principle in his moving assembly line in the early twentieth century.
Ford was not being Lean but just very efficient with his mass production system, as the
methods he used "only worked when production volumes were high enough to justify
high-speed assembly lines, when every product used exactly the same parts, and when the
same model was produced for many years" (Womack and Jones, 1996, p. 23). The
concept of flow has influenced Lean thought and practices over the years, and helped
encourage the use of small batch sizes and a system of cards and bins to manage internal
inventory (known as "kanbans"), as well as the just-in-time inventory system (which has
incorrectly become thought of as synonymous with Lean).
Once a value stream has been aligned such that the value can flow from one step to the
next, the concept of "pull" can be applied to it. This concept states that an upstream task
should not be performed until a downstream task asks for its output. In other words, any
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given task should behave as if the next task in sequence is its customer, and should only
provide an output when that task asks for an input. Pull is the opposite of "push"-based
systems of production. In a push system, an upstream task is performed and its output
sits around until it can be used by the downstream task. This encourages inventories
building up, is often the result of manufacturing being performed in large batches (which
mass-production systems view as the most efficient way to make an item). When in a
manufacturing environment, pushing a large batch of items onto a downstream task not
only creates inventories, but can lead to a great deal of waste if a problem is found with
the quality of the output items. In the ultimate flowing pull-based system, an order would
be placed by the customer and placed at the end of the manufacturing line. The operator
of the last task would ask the operators of upstream tasks for the exact items needed for
his task. This pattern would continue, and each task would output exactly the number of
items needed by its downstream task, in what has been dubbed "single-piece flow".
The final key concept in Lean is the pursuit of perfection. All wastes cannot be
eliminated overnight and production systems cannot be made to perfectly flow the first
time. Lean requires an enterprise to never be satisfied, to always seek ways to perform
better. As long as progress is being made, with perfection of the value-delivery system
the goal, the journey to a Lean state is ongoing. Toyota, by far the recognized exemplar
of a Lean enterprise, continually strives to improve itself. A company just starting the
Lean journey should not think that it can "become" Lean instantly. The implementation
of Lean is a considerable undertaking. Oftentimes, in order to properly eliminate wastes
and properly align the value stream such that the value can flow at the pull of
downstream activities, a redefining of the work to be done is required. Departmental
structures that may have existed for years (which made sense historically but now cause
waste) may need to be broken down, with a new organization of functions and product
teams formed. A fundamental cultural shift must be made as all employees must
embrace the desire to make not only their job better, but to make the entire value stream
flow better.
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In their Decoding the DNA ofthe Toyota Production System, Spear and Bowen suggest
that all the employees of the TPS form a "community of scientists", with each using the
scientific method every day in order to solve problems in the pursuit of perfection (Spear
and Bowen, 1999). They claim that in addition to the Lean principles, four fundamental
rules are implicitly employed at Toyota. These rules explain the paradox of how Toyota
uses rigid specification to create operational flexibility and adaptability. The first of
these rules states that all work must be specified as regards content, sequence, timing, and
outcome. By doing this, workers know exactly what is expected and how they are
expected to do it. Also, with detailed specification of these facts, they are able to
experiment to perfect their tasks. The second rule states that all customer-supplier
relationships must be standardized and direct, allowing for more accountability between
business partners and reducing variability within the value creation process. The third
rule states that the physical arrangement of the production line must allow every product
and service to be able to flow in a simple, direct, and specified path through the plant.
The fourth rule states that any improvement to the specifications dictated by the three
above rules must be performed using the scientific method, under the guidance of a
teacher, at the lowest level possible. Observations must lead to hypothesis, which are
systematically tested until they match observation. Any time a problem cannot be solved
at the lowest level, it must go up to someone on a higher level within the organization
who may have more insight into solving the problem. One systematic way that problems
are solved is the use of the "5 'Why's" approach. Whenever a problem is observed, the
question of "why?" is presented and answered. The question is then repeated with
respect to the previous answer until there is no answer. At this point, the employees have
more insight into where to begin their experimentation. Usually "why?" need not be
asked more than five times to uncover any problem. Thus, the TPS can be constantly
improved by practicing the scientific method, which is enabled by rigid specification.
This fact embodies the Lean principle of pursuing perfection. (Spear and Bowen, 1999)
On the whole, Lean has made great strides since the 1990 MIT book. The concepts that
make it work have been identified, and many companies have started to see the positive
synergistic effects of employing them all as appropriate. As Lean has been transferred
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from the relatively high-production automotive industry to other industries, organized
research has been needed to determine how to properly transfer these ideas to best fit
each industry. Lean principles have spread and many related techniques are being
applied in such diverse areas as supply chain management, accounting, office paperwork,
and even health care. However, the application of Lean in these areas and others is in its
infancy. Product development is an area particularly ripe for the application of Lean
principles and techniques. Researchers are currently struggling to find the best ways to
apply Lean to PD with early indications of success.
2.2 Product Development
Product development is a wide area, with a vast amount of literature related to it. This
section does not attempt to comprehensively represent this literature, but provides the
reader with an understanding of what the context and basic steps of the process are, along
with explain how the process is different when dealing with large, complex systems such
as those that are often found in the aerospace/defense industry.
At some point, some people sat down and really thought hard about how to make each
and every one of the products that one encounters-a telephone, a computer, a car, a
blender, a cordless drill, or an ink pen. The result of the product development process is
evident all around-from the ergonomic shape of a stapler to the sound output from a
pair of speakers- in the form and function of the products.
In the simplest view possible, an enterprise is a group of people that take ideas and turn
them into money by creating and delivering products, processes, services, and/or systems.
While it would be foolish to imply that an enterprise is such a simple entity, there really
are two major components of the above statement: creating the product and delivering
the product. Product development is a general term that describes the creation process:
taking an idea for a product and turning it into a set of instructions for its manufacture
and assembly. Manufacturing, sales, and distribution are responsible for the delivery of
the product.
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Ulrich and Eppinger (1999) explain the several major steps of general product
development. First, the needs of the customer must be identified and then used to
establish target specifications. These needs and specifications can be related to the
product appearance, physical characteristics, functional characteristics, or overall
performance, and are used to drive the development of the product. Once the product's
goals are established, system-level design is performed. In this stage, the system
architecture is selected and decisions are made about how to decompose the product into
subsystems and components that can work together to deliver the desired functionality.
Next comes the detail design, in which the product is fully defined. Drawings are made
and software is laid out. This stage really is the heart of product development, and is
where most engineering effort is expended. While several important high-level decisions
were made during the system-level design, it is during the detail design that literally
hundreds of finer decisions must be made to fully define the product. Next comes testing
and refinement, in which prototypes are made and the product's design is finalized.
Finally, during production ramp-up the manufacturing system is set up and prepared to
make the products and the distribution channels are established. (Ulrich and Eppinger,
1999)
Product development within the aerospace/defense industry differs slightly from the
above general process. First, the products in this industry are generally large and
complex. Many systems literally push against the laws of physics, and many need state-
of-the-art technology to do so. The complexity of most of these systems has many
ramifications. In order to be manageable, the development must be broken down into
understandable sections. Managing the large development efforts is usually done with
many layers of management and leadership. As the complexity of a system development
increases, so does the number of people required for its execution. The more people that
are involved in a project, the greater the need is for increased communication and
management effort. Also, the complexity of these systems makes them very expensive,
and in order to make the development economical, large orders are often placed. With
large contracts for expensive products come very interested customers. Since most
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customers are large enterprises in and of themselves, such as national governments or
airlines, that are committing large sums of money to the development and delivery of
products, they want to be assured the desired functionality will be delivered. Information
must flow in two directions for the development to be successful. First, the requirements
for the product must be created and unambiguously passed on down to the designers.
Developing and communicating the requirements is a difficult process, and is often done
in a series of requirements documents, with each being more specific about what the
product system must do. At certain points in the course of the design, design reviews are
held for the product development leadership team (and often, also the customer) to
review the status of the design and the design process.
Meeting customer needs is a crucial component for success in the world of product
development. Consumer products are designed and then manufactured and sold, in hopes
that they meet the needs and wants of the customer. Due to the complexity of aerospace
systems, fully defining exactly the needs of the customer (and other system development
stakeholders) is a difficult process. These needs are reflected by statements of the desired
system functionality called "requirements". These requirements serve to communicate
the functions desired by the product's stakeholders to the engineers that must implement
them. The requirements derivation process is often very difficult, and is often performed
by systems engineers. This process begins with the definition of overall system
operational characteristics by the customer. These operational requirements are then
turned into a set of technical requirements. As the overall system design is derived from
these technical requirements, high-level requirements are made for each of the
subsystems. These high-level requirements are used to begin exploring the subsystem
design and are thereby expanded into detailed specifications that fully define the
requirements of each subsystem. Only after the system's requirements have been fully
defined should the detailed system design begin in earnest, lest work be done on some
area that contradicts a later-developed requirement. Developing and managing these
requirements throughout the entire development process is often so complicated and so
essential for the successful design of a complicated system that it often requires the work
of systems engineers, software and hardware engineers, and senior program leadership.
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As the requirements reach various levels of maturity, they must be communicated back to
the customer to make sure they reflect what is really desired by the stakeholders. In order
to do this, and to communicate the status of the product's design, design reviews are held
throughout the process. These reviews are often large meetings in which the status of the
design and the requirements are presented, along with budgetary and schedule
information regarding the direction of the next steps of the development. Usually, two
such reviews are held: a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and a Critical Design
Review (CDR). These reviews divide the "detail design" described in the Ulrich and
Eppinger process into two phases: preliminary and detail design. The PDR is held at the
end of the preliminary design phase, and CDR is held at the end of the detailed design.
These design reviews allow the stakeholders to comment on the design, to point out
issues, and to request changes. Sometimes, a another design review will be held. Known
as the Advanced Design Review (ADR), this review usually comes before the others, at
the end of the system design, and reviews the requirements and high-level system design
so that the preliminary design can begin.
The figure below shows the lifecycle of a typical aerospace product. This graphic is a
little tricky at first, as it displays a lot of information in an atypical fashion. The flow of
time is downward, and the triangular shape indicates the increasing value delivered by the
development. This triangle is divided into many layers that indicate the stages of the
process, each with inputs on the left and outputs on the right. First the company
developing the system will work with the customer to develop the requirements and
create the overall system design. After this stage is where the ADR might be held. Next,
the preliminary design begins, further defining the requirements and establishing the
major parts of each subsystem design. This preliminary design is presented at the PDR,
and offers a solid basis for the detail design effort. The detail design results in a fully-
defined design for the system, its subsystems, and all components. After the design is
reviewed and approved, fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing (FAIT) is
performed. This step is akin to the "testing and refinement" expressed by Ulrich and
Eppinger's general process (Ulrich and Eppinger, 1999) , and is basically a prototyping
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phase to ensure that the system can be produced and will function as required before full-
scale production begins. Within the FAIT process, components are produced and
individually tested, as are assemblies made of them. Also, the software and hardware are
integrated and tested, and the overall system functionality is ensured. After FAIT is
complete, production of the system begins, and the system is delivered to the customer.
If more than one unit of the system is contracted, they are usually delivered in waves.
The development enterprise will continue to offer support to the customer to help fine
tune and maintain the system. As this process proceeds, more value is added to the
system and the amount of risk of not receiving a functional system perceived by the
customer decreases. The value of the process lies not only in the receipt of the functional
system but also in the progressive reduction in risk. Within this product lifecycle the PD
process can be considered to begin at the top and end before production. This point is
where the creation of the system ends and the delivery of functionality begins.
Figure 2.2 Product Development Process in the Aerospace and Defense Industry
(adapted from Millard, 2001)
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2.3 Problems in PD
The established process for product development in aerospace and defense has been
developed over the past decades, but having been around a long time does not mean it is
perfect. Oftentimes, system developments within this industry run over budget, behind
schedule, and/or under-perform the requirements. When viewed from a Lean
perspective, it is easy to understand why this is the case.
Various research into the aerospace industry has found some facts that astound the
outsider but are no surprise to anyone within the industry. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below
show the results of two separate studies into how engineers spend their time. The first of
these graphs shows the results of a survey. Engineers were asked to estimate how much
of their work effort (in time-card hours) was spent adding value, how much was spent in
support tasks, and how much was wasted, and they reported 40% was wasted and only
about 30% was value-added. (McManus, 2000) Another, more formal study found that
30-40% of engineering effort is wasted (Joglekar and Whitney, 2000). Figure 2.3 shows
this analysis of time spent in a different light. Instead of looking at it from the point of
view of the individual engineer, this study followed the path of an individual work
package as it passed from one engineer to another in the course of its development. It
was found that 60% of the time, a job is sitting idle, waiting to be addressed by the next
engineer (Young, 2000).
Figure 2.3 Value Assessment of Figure 2.4 Assessment of Activity Performed on
Aerospace Engineering Activity (as % Aerospace Work Packages (as % of actual hours)
of hours worked) (McManus, 2004) (McManus, 2004)
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Assuming that these study results are typical of various product development tasks, they
have been combined into a notional result shown in Figure 2.4. The data combines to
indicate that value is being added to a work package only about 12% of the time!
Obviously if these numbers are representative, then PD needs a great deal of help to
become more efficient! These numbers have been supported anecdotally by many Lean
events held at LAI member companies in which 75-90% idle times were identified in
bottleneck processes (McManus, 2004).
12% Value Added Activity
11% Necessary
Non Value Added
62% Job Idle
77% of Time A'1%Pr
is PURE WASTE15% Pure
Waste Activity
Figure 2.5 Notional Value Assessment of a Typical
Aerospace Engineering Work Package (McManus, 2004)
On the whole, product development has been an essential part of commercial industry for
years, but extensive research shows that it is in need of help. Lean has great potential to
help improve PD. The next section chronicles how this has been attempted, and the next
chapter describes how this thesis fits within the research strategy.
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2.4 Lean and PD
Lean enterprises must design and manufacture the right products in an efficient manner.
To deliver the right products, enterprises must create products that meet the needs of all
stakeholders. Each enterprise must be well-integrated such that the PD process adds
value throughout the product lifecycle and for all stakeholders. To be efficient in
delivering the systems, most enterprises have begun improving their manufacturing
capabilities using Lean concepts. The final piece of the puzzle is efficient development
of systems. By applying Lean to PD practices, it is hoped that PD process efficiency and
consistency can increase. Specifically, the goal is to make PD processes have shorter
cycle times and be cheaper. (McManus, 2004)
Finding ways to make PD more efficient and effective is the goal of this research.
Several people have made great strides in pursuing how to make PD more Lean, and have
consistently encountered several differences between engineering and manufacturing that
make application of Lean techniques to product development difficult. Morgan (2002)
notes five major differences between PD and manufacturing that make it difficult to
apply Lean to PD:
1) PD deals with the flow of information, not physical entities
2) PD time measures are much longer and often ill-defined
3) Much PD work is intangible, and it is more diverse and less predictable.
4) PD information flows are often non-linear and multi-directional, with
iterations, reciprocal flows, and therefore more communication needed
5) PD needs more people, with a more diverse set of knowledge and skills
Slack(1998) was the first to describe how the Womack and Jones's Lean principles could
all be applied to the PD process. He found that the value, value stream, and flow
principles needed to be altered to make sense with respect to PD. He questioned the
application of the pull principle to PD, but supported the generality of the perfection
principle. He also presented a discussion of the analogs to manufacturing waste within
product development and how manufacturing flow techniques can be applied to a product
development context.
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2.4.1 Value
In his analysis of all the Lean principles, Slack focused upon the value principle. He
suggested that the value of product development can be decomposed in various ways.
First, it can be broken down into customer value, employee value, and company
shareholder value, and he showed a notional relationship between these three. He further
decomposed the customer value into three major components quality, cost of ownership,
and time. This decomposition is shown below in Figure 2.6. Additionally, he defined a
simple equation for estimating the value of product development. (Slack, 1999)
Punctional and
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Figure 2.6 Slack's Decomposition of Customer Value (Slack, 1999)
Browning (1998 & 2003) has suggested that the status of a product development process
can be measured by tracking the uncertainty of the process output. As risk goes down,
information about the product, and therefore value, increases. He also claims risk exists
in the forms of technical, cost, schedule, technology, market, and business risks and that
reduction in risk can be used as a measure of value. He created highly detailed equations
for analyzing the uncertainty associated with a certain task, as well as the overall risk this
caused. Finally, he also argues that product value is a function of performance,
affordability, and timeliness.
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Chase (2001) is highly suggested reading for learning about value in product
development. He created a framework for value creation within the PD process based
upon his analysis of many previous definition of value and several case studies. He
agreed with Slack's first value decomposition, suggesting that the value of product
development includes delivering a successful product to the customer, profits for the
shareholder, and lifetime satisfaction for the employee. The elements of his framework
were tasks, resources, environment, and management, and each of these was divided into
various levels of value attributes-how a task contributes to value, shown below in Table
2.1. By combining these value attributes, one can construct the value of a PD process.
Additionally, he found that the value of product development is more easily understood
when broken down into product value and process value. His research also showed that
development efforts that used earned value management had fewer tasks behind schedule
than those that did not. Chase's conceptual framework was based on the idea that as
product development tasks accumulate information, risk is decreased and thus, product
value increases. Once the product is complete and all value accumulated, it can then be
exchanged for money with the customer. He also surmised that product value is the
nexus of a product's cost, schedule, and performance (similar to Slack's Time, Quality,
and Cost of Ownership decomposition).
Oehmen (2005) collected the ideas from Chase, Slack, and Browning (among others) to
create a framework of value within PD. Similar to Chase, Oehmen separates value into
product value and PD process value. For each of these, Time, Cost, and Quality are the
generic goals. Table 2.1 shows these six major categories of value. These categories are
used for the value analysis of the value stream maps later in this thesis.
Table 2.1 Oehmen PD Value Framework (Oehmen, 2005)
Time Cost Quality
Product (lead time) (lifecycle cost) (performance)
Process (schedule (budget adherence) (conformity to
adherence) standards)
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2.4.2 Value Stream
The use of values stream maps (VSM) within PD has gained popularity in the past few
years. Millard (2001) analyzed various techniques that claim to show PD process
information. He found that Gantt and Ward charts were better at representating for the
timing of tasks, but that Process Flow Charts, Learning to See diagrams, and Design
Structure Matrices were the best for analyzing the process.
By far, Morgan (2002) has made the most complete attempt to understand how to employ
Lean in PD. He explored the application of Lean in depth and proposed a systems
approach to creating a "High Performance Product Development Process". To make
such a system, an enterprise must have an integrated, coherent system consisting of goal-
aligned, mutually-supportive subsystems: human, process, and technology. For the
human subsystem to work, it must effectively integrate many groups of diverse technical
specialists. He suggested that improving the process subsystem was the first step to
achieving this PD system, and his research focused upon this. His analysis was based
upon an analysis of the Toyota Production System and the product development
processes Toyota uses. He argued for the usefulness of value stream mapping and
developed his own map style.
Morgan (2002) elucidated many of the issues surrounding the use of VSMs in PD. In
addition to identifying many major problems with PD, he proclaimed that value stream
mapping is very powerful. He says that VSM not only should be used as the first step for
optimizing the PD process, but also that it enhances the use of other optimization tools,
strengthens the grasp of the overall process (discouraging local optimization &
encouraging finding leverage points), is useful in synchronizing concurrent and cross-
functional tasks, makes cause-and-effect relationships more evident, and serves as a
common language between functional organizations for discussing the PD process. He
claims that "VSM is perhaps the most effective tool for improving PD concurrency
because of its ability to display multiple functional activities simultaneously at different
levels of detail". For each of the five major differences between PD and manufacturing
he identified, he developed countermeasures for use in making VSMs for PD. He
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suggested separating the value stream map into horizontal layers, each representing a
different functional group, all aligned with a single time scale. He also proposed that this
time scale could change as one looked at the map at different levels of detail. Thus, he
plans to have multiple levels of detail to make a map that can be "zoomed". Furthermore,
he created his own set of symbols for representing activities, information flows
(differentiating between push and pull, and various information types), events, delays,
and activities. He proposed that a data box be attached to each task that displays a great
deal of information about it. Finally, he gave steps for creating and analyzing the current
state map, as well as suggestions for creating a future-state map.
McManus's (2004) Product Development Value Stream Mapping (PDVSM) Manual
offers a guide for practitioners to make a PDVSM. It takes many of the lessons learned
from Millard's and Morgan's work, along with those from numerous industry case
studies to create a near-cookbook for detailing the creation of a current state map,
analyzing it for waste and value, and for creating a future-state map. An example of one
these PDVSMs is shown on the following page as Figure 2.7. While this Manual offers a
great methodology and set of symbols, it is limited in scope and scale to the mapping and
improvement of a single, definable component-level hardware design PD process. Thus,
this cookbook approach had to be modified for use on the projects in Chapters 4 and 5.
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2.4.3 Flow
The flow of value within PD is more difficult to analyze than it is within manufacturing.
Value flow within PD has been with the flow of information. According to Sawhney and
Parikh (2001), "In an information economy, improving the utility of the information is
synonymous with creating economic value. Where intelligence resides, so does value."
Thus, most focus on flow within PD has been upon how information flows between
project tasks and the impediments to the flow, or waste. In addition to his work on value
stream mapping, Millard (2001) described the quality of information flow in terms of
form, fit, function, and timeliness. Graebsch (2005) studied the flows of information
within PD processes, defining, categorizing, and analyzing the quality and content of
information and its transfer between people. He found that more information flow is not
necessarily better, but that high-quality information transfers, especially those planned in
advance, are more likely to require less future communication and do a better job of
transferring information value. He also systematically developed the requirements for a
Lean Product Development Display. Also, Millard (2001) translated the seven classic
manufacturing wastes into what they meant relative to PD. Morgan (2002) found eleven
classes of information waste. Several others did similarly, and Bauch (2004) collected
and organized the various types of information wastes in PD. He created a framework
that consisted of what can be wasted, main waste drivers, and sub-categories of these
waste drivers. He then correlated these waste drivers to analyze how one type of waste
breeds others, and used this analysis to create a strategy for sequential elimination of
waste types.
2.4.4 Pull
The principle of pull is much harder to apply in PD than in a manufacturing environment,
especially due to the fact that PD does not have physical items to be passed from one step
to the next. Also, due to the lengthy and uncertain PD process, one cannot be assured
that customers will want the output before the process is complete. Finally, the iterative
nature of PD tasks makes implementing a pull system difficult (Slack, 1999). Despite
these difficulties, Oppenheim (2004) has tried to establish a Lean Product Development
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Flow System. This proposed system uses a value stream map to plan the work for an
extended project, and then breaks down the tasks involved into subtasks that can be
completed during short, constant-duration "takt" periods. An integrative event is held
between each of these periods to collect the information created by individual engineers
during the takt period and to adjust planning.
2.4.5 Perfection
Finally, the Lean principle of "pursue perfection" has not been explicitly dealt with in
previous research. Slack (1999) appropriately pointed out that this principle can be
generalized to any area. Continuous improvement and creating a learning environment
have been cited consistently as ways to encourage the constant improvement required by
this principle (Spear and Bowen 1999, Morgan 2002). Pursuit of perfection really
represents a hunger that must exist in a Lean enterprise-the desire to do better by
solving the problems that prevent improvement.
2.4.6 Lean PD Summary
Lean is an improvement philosophy that holds great potential to help the problems seen
within the type of complex product development in the aerospace/defense industry.
While several other PD process improvements such as set-based design and axiomatic
design seek to turn PD on its ear, Lean PD seeks to make the established process more
efficient by identifying areas needing improvement and streamlining with a focus on
creating value. Research has shown that Lean can be applied to PD, but there is much
more that needs to be done in order to enable the creation of truly Lean PD systems.
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2.5 Earned Value Management System Data Primer
While Lean has proven to be very useful by focusing on value, the concept of value is
nothing new. Leaders have long sought a way to make their products more valuable, and
to make sure that their development practices are efficient and effective. Several
frameworks exist for tracking a project's progress and for managing project. As is the
case with most systems, the observation involved with the progress tracking affects the
outcome of the process. Project management structures impact the overall value of a
project and can drive behavior within a PD process. By studying how these systems are
used, and how they purportedly measure value, one can learn more about what businesses
officially consider valuable.
One such project management framework that is widely used in the aerospace/defense
industry is the Earned Value Management System (EVMS). Government regulations
stipulate that for defense contracts of a certain size EVMS must be used for planning and
management. Essentially, EVMS is a system for measuring the value of process tasks
and estimating and updating the budget and schedule for a project. However, the "value"
it measures is based upon the budget assigned to a given task, not to how it affects the
outcome of the process.
EVMS starts with a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). It breaks a project into small
tasks to be accomplished, and assigns a budget and schedule for their completion by
certain groups of people. The progress on each task is estimated as a percentage each
month when EVMS reports are filed. By multiplying the percentage of task progress by
the budgeted "value" of the task (equal to the task's budget), the amount of the "earned
value" for that task can be calculated. When a task is totally complete, all of its "value"
should be reported as having been "earned" (and should be equal to the budget for the
task). This "earned value" is accumulated over the course of the project and should add
up to the total budget of the project if everything is completed.
EVMS reports are filed every month, and the completion percentage for each task is
reported in these files. The task's completion ratio is multiplied by the budgeted cost of
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the task to arrive at the task's earned value. If Task X is worth $10, and it is estimated as
being 80% complete at the end of the month, then $8 of value has been earned.
Simple, right?! Well, not so fast.
This completion percentage is often difficult for managers to estimate. Once a task is
complete, it is obviously 100% complete; before completion, however, it is often difficult
to estimate just how complete the task is. What is the difference between a task being
70% and 90% complete?
Once the earned value for each task has been determined for a given month, they are
combined to arrive at the total project monthly EV. This number is referred to as the
"Budgeted Cost of Work Performed" (BCWP). The BCWP is really the "earned value"
for the project. By comparing the BCWP with two special numbers, the status of the
project can be ascertained.
First, the amount of "earned value" for a given month is compared with the amount of
work that was planned to be completed for that month, referred to as the "Budgeted Cost
of Work Scheduled" (BCWS). The BCWS is determined by the WBS, and is the amount
of task completion planned to be done in a given timeframe multiplied by the budget of
each of the WBS tasks. Essentially, it is just how the budget is divided into the schedule.
The sum of the BCWS for each month of a project equals the total budget of the project.
If a project has every task completed on it, then at its completion, the BCWS and the
BCWP should be equal, and should equal the baseline budget of the project.
The BCWP should, but does not always, agree with the "Actual Cost of Work
Performed" (ACWP), which unsurprisingly represents the amount of money actually
spent to do the work that was performed. ACWP can be tricky because oftentimes it
includes work that is done for tasks that are not claimed for EV until the next month.
BCWS, BCWP, and ACWP can include both labor and material costs, and are usually
36
reported in dollars. For each month, they are usually reported for both the individual task
and the project as a whole.
BCWP, BCWS, and ACWP can be compared in several meaningful ways. Differences
and ratios of BCWP to both BCWS and ACWP are calculated. Schedule Variance and
Cost Variance are very important to EVMS. Schedule Variance (SV) is the difference
between BCWP and BCWS. If the BCWP is larger than the BCWS, then the SV is
positive, and more work has been completed than was planned. BCWP < BCWS, SV is
negative, and the project is behind schedule on that task. Cost Variance (CV) is the
difference between BCWP and ACWP. If the ACWP <BCWP, then less money has been
spent to achieve a certain amount of work and thus to claim a certain amount of earned
value. If ACWP is greater than BCWP, then it has cost more to do the work than was
planned, and thus the project is behind budget, as is usually the case in the
aerospace/defense industry. Essentially, SV and CV are used to assess how far off
budget and schedule a task is. While it makes sense that CV is reported it dollars, it
should not be a big surprise that SV is too. The variance in the schedule reported by SV
is not really a measure of how far behind completion any given task or set of tasks is, but
it indicates how far behind schedule the project is with respect to earning value.
Similarly, the Schedule Performance Index and the Cost Performance Index are used to
check the how well the project is performing to schedule and budget, respectively.
Schedule Performance Index (SPI) is the ratio of BCWP to BCWS. SPI is favorable
when its value is 1.0 or greater, which implies that BCWP>BCWS and thus that work is
on or ahead of schedule. Similarly, CPI is the ratio of BCWP to ACWP, and CPI values
of 1.0 or greater are preferred. A CPI less than one implies that BCWP<ACWP and that
the project is over budget for the amount of earned value that has been completed (i.e it
has cost more to complete the work than was planned).
Whereas SV and CV are absolute measures of how far the project is away from its
planned schedule and budget, SPI and CPI are relative performance measures that serve
project leaders and managers better during the course of the project. Generally, they try
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to keep SPI and CPI between 0.9 and 1.1. In the case of Company X, they try to keep it
closer to 1, between 0.98 and 1.02.
In summary, EVMS is a system used to manage the progress of large projects. Its many
acronyms can be very confusing, and Table 5.2 attempts to eliminate any remaining
befuddlement by giving each of the EVMS acronyms, its full name, a description in
layman's terms, and (if applicable) the equation that generates it. As currently practiced,
EVMS is not fully consistent with Lean or its application to PD. My research seeks
better approaches for adapting EVMS to enable Lean PD.
Table 2.2 EVMS Terms
Acronym Full Name My Layman's Terms Formula
Earned ValueEVMS Management System a way to keep track of project progress" N/A
Work Breakdown "a division of the project into smallerWBS Structure tasks that can be completed by the teams N/A
assigned to them"
BCWS Budgeted Cost of "what should get done in the time N/AWork Scheduled scheduled"
BCWP Budgeted Cost of "what actually got done" N/AWork Performed
ACWP Actual Cost of Work "what it cost to actually perform the N/APerformed work"
SV Schedule Variance "how much was completed relative to SV = BCWP - BCWS
what was expected"
CV Cost Variance "how much it cost to do what was CV = BCWP - ACWP
_________________________complete relative to what was expected" C CP-AW
SPI Schedule "normalized measure of how far away SPI = BCWP/BCWSPerformance Index from the schedule the task is"
CPC ost Performance "normalized measure of how far away CPI = BCWP/ACWPIndex from the budget the task is"
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3 Research Strategy
The Lean Aerospace Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was formed
in 1993 to determine how to best apply the concepts of Lean to the aerospace industry.
This consortium, which consists of MIT, the United States Air Force, and several
aerospace companies, seeks to help aerospace enterprises create value to achieve lasting
success in their environment of constant change. The first years were spent determining
that the concepts of Lean really were applicable to this industry. LAI now focuses on the
creation of Lean enterprises. In their award-winning book Lean Enterprise Value
(Murman et al., 2002), LAI researchers explain what this means:
A lean enterprise is an integrated entity that efficiently creates value for
its multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and practices.
(Murman et al., 2002)
In order to learn more about creating such Lean enterprises, LAI is divided into three
major research focus areas: Enterprise Architecture, Enterprise Change, and Product
Lifecycle. A group of researchers within the Product Lifecycle group have focused upon
product development. Robert Slack, Richard Millard, James Chase, Dr. Hugh McManus,
and Dr. Eric Rebentisch preceded my involvement in the PD group. Their work has
shown that lean applies to PD, that value definition is difficult, that value stream mapping
is powerful, and have provided a guide for creating PDVSMs and for the transitioning of
product development systems to a more Lean state. In addition to McManus's and
Rebentisch's continued involvement, newer members of the group include Prof. Warren
Seering, Christoph Bauch, Martin Graebsch, Jin Kato, and Josef Oehmen. Recent
research has attacked the application of Lean to PD from several angles. Bauch (2004)
focused upon understanding PD waste, while Graebsch (2004) looked at information flow
in the PD process and the creation of a Lean PD display. Oehmen (2005) studied the
integration of risk management into Lean PD, with an additional focus on high-
performance PD teams.
In different ways, both Kato (2005) and I have focused upon the usefulness of PDVSMs
in identifying value creation. Kato focused primarily upon making veryfinely detailed
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PDVSMs that looked at how individual engineers spent their time on relatively short-
term software projects in Japan. He was able to use the wastes from Bauch's waste
driver framework to identify and measure the waste seen in these processes. He found
that information inventory was prevalent in these processes, and that over-processing,
rework, and defective information were the three most significant waste drivers. My
work also used PDVSM, but I studied much longer development processes. While my
maps are very detailed, they are not at the same level of resolution as Kato's.
My research strategy was to find several projects within an LAI member company, create
value stream maps of their processes, and compare the maps to official value
measurements. Company X offered several candidate projects within a single facility,
and was able to help me greatly. Funding was provided for the time that engineers and
managers spent talking to me, and I was granted access to "unclassified" information and
areas of the facility. The projects that I chose ultimately revolved around the types of
complex and technically demanding products that Company X has made for years, and
were thus representative of the typical work at this facility. While both projects were in
multifaceted contexts, one project focused upon software development and the other dealt
with hardware. The projects were in different stages of development: one was in the
requirements phase of a standard PD process, and one was in a technology development
phase for a much larger spiral development process. The diverse nature of these projects
helps make their results more easily representative of complex PD in general, but the
facts that there were only two case studies and that they were both performed at the same
company facility detract from my ability to generalize these results.
It is hoped that the combination of my work and Kato's (along with that of future
students) will help clarify the proper level of detail and resolution needed in a map for
identifying various type of value. Also, by studying the similarities and differences of
our maps, one may be able to gather a better understanding of how to create the zoom-
able VSMs proposed by Morgan (2002) and determine their usefulness. Ultimately,
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making such maps would be ideal for the Lean PD Display that Graebsch (2004)
proposed.
In the chapters that follow, I explain my two case studies. I discuss the context of the
development efforts, show the PDVSMs created, analyze the value of the tasks in the
PDVSMs, and show the data for the official Company X measurement of value, the
Earned Value Management System. I then compare my PDVSMs and value analyses to
the EVMS data and point out discrepancies and alignments. In the final chapter, these
results are summarized, and a hybrid PDVSM/EVMS system is proposed.
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4 Project S - Software Requirements Development
In this project, engineers worked to create the requirements for a software subsystem to
be used in the operation of a large radar system. Controlling the radar system and
interpreting the information it gathers requires a great deal of information technology
before, during, and after the system is actively in use. This specific software subsystem
will be used before and after radar missions. The project's ultimate output was a large
document (-200 pages) detailing the requirements needed to design the subsystem.
Figure 4.1 System C Development Process
Radar System C Development Process
SystemSystem
Concept Requirements PreRiminary Detail FAR t System
Generation Development Design Design Delivery
Requirements Development Process B-Spec Development: 
-
Hardware Requirements4...B2 Spec
Operation Technical Development B3 Spec
Requirements Requirements A-Spec B4 Spec
Document Document Software Requirements B5 Spec
Develo ment (SRS)
4.1 Project S Context
The project involved a portion of the radar system's requirements development phase, as
shown above in Figure 4.1. The System C requirements have recently been completed,
and system preliminary design has begun. Next will come detail design, and then the
system's physical components and subsystems will then be fabricated, assembled,
integrated, and tested (FAIT). In parallel, each software subsystem will be coded and
unit tested (tested in small sections), and then combined into a full software system and
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tested. The full software system will then be integrated with the hardware for overall
system testing.
The requirements development process consists of four main tasks. First, an operational
requirements document (ORD) is created. The System C government customer writes
the ORD (-10 pages), which defines the main goals and minimum acceptable
requirements for successful operation of the proposed system concept. Next, a Technical
Requirements Document (-20 pages) was created from the ORD, and it defines
performance requirements for the system and key sub-systems. Next, the "System
Specifications" (Martin, 1997), also known as the "A Level Specification" or more
commonly "A-spec" (-100 pages), is made by elaborating upon the TRD to create many
high-level requirements for the various subsystems.
Portions of the A-spec requirements are then fleshed out to create the "B Level
Specifications" for the various subsystems. Each of these B-specs serve as
"Development Specifications" (Martin, 1997) for a specific subsystem. As is indicated in
Figure 4.1, there are several kinds of B-specs. These cover system components (a Bi-
spec), critical items (B2), noncomplex items (B3), facility modifications (B4), and
software (B5). Together, these B-specs are thousands of pages long and fully define the
requirements for the system. Each of these B-specs is composed of hundreds of
paragraphs detailing requirements in the form of "shalls".
A "shall" is a statement or paragraph that states a functionality that must be exhibited by
the subsystem or part. In other words, a "shall" is a requirement of what the subsystem
must do to be considered functionally operational. For example, were I to write
requirements for a computer keyboard, the "shalls" might include: "The keyboard system
shall allow entry of data into a computer system.", "The keyboard system shall be
comprised of many keys.", and "Each key on the keyboard system shall enable entry of a
different data symbol." (among many others). Since these "shalls" are such detailed and
specific description of functionality, it should be no surprise that they are referred to
collectively as "specifications". The system involved in Project S is much more
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complicated than a simple keyboard, and thus there are very many "shalls" needed to
specify its functionality.
These software B-specs (B5) are known as "Software Requirements Specifications"
(SRS). According to Martin (1997) the "SRS describes in detail the functional, interface,
quality factors, special and qualification requirements necessary to design, develop, test,
evaluate, and deliver" a software subsystem. The software for System C is comprised of
eight subsystems, and each of these subsystems will have a corresponding SRS (B5
spec). Of these eight subsystems, the engineers studied worked on creating the SRS for
Subsystem P. This SRS development effort is referred to as Project S.
The total budget for the requirements development and design of Subsystem P was 6% of
the budget for the total software subsystem. The SRS development was budgeted to cost
just 5% of the entire development effort for Subsystem P. Thus, this SRS effort was a
small part of a single software subsystem development effort within a much larger system
development effort. That is not to say that this was a miniscule project: its final budget
was several hundred thousand dollars.
Each of these SRS documents is a few hundred pages long, and they are often referred to
as "books" because of their size. As was the case for the other subsystems, the
development of the Subsystem P SRS was managed by a "book boss". He was in charge
of delivering the document.
4.2 Project Specifics
Subsystem P must allow a user to tell the radar system where and when to illuminate the
sky, and it must be able to decode, interpret, and store the massive amounts of electronic
data that are created by other software subsystems during a single radar usage. This
specific software subsystem must also help with re-calibrating the overall radar system
(to ensure system accuracy), as well as with limiting where the radars can shine (to
minimize the likelihood of causing collateral damage).
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4.2.1 Project S Marching Orders
The SRS "book boss" was given a set of four directions from the project leadership team
on how to conduct Project S. First and foremost, the SRS must meet the requirements set
out in the A-spec. Nothing should appear in the SRS that cannot be traced back to a
requirement in the A-spec, and each relevant A-spec requirement must be addressed.
Secondly, the group was directed to reuse as many requirements from another radar
system as was possible. Third, they were instructed to simplify the document as much as
possible. Finally, they were told that once all of the above conditions were met, they
could then consider writing requirements for new customer demands or requests.
4.2.2 Requirements Reuse in Project S
Company X has a great deal of experience with creating radar systems. In order to
leverage their existing knowledge, they chose to reuse requirements from previous radar
systems in the creation of the System C requirements. Requirements reuse involves
analyzing the requirements from one system and manipulating them so that they can be
properly used in a new system. Sometimes, requirements are strictly copied verbatim, but
other times, changes (small or large) may be required to make the requirements better
suited for the new system.
The group was initially directed to reuse all of the requirements from a previous project,
System H. However, since System C was thought to be more complex than System H, it
was assumed that these reused requirements would comprise only about 80% of the new
system's requirements. The other 20% of the System C requirements would be totally
new requirements. This reuse plan did not last long.
A change occurred early in the project, as the government customer dictated that Project
S should use a different system as a basis for requirements reuse. Systems C's design
was to be based upon that of System T instead of System H. System T was a "Classified"
project owned by a different company, and this led to a difficult process for the team to
45
obtain the SRS for the subsystem of System T corresponding to Subsystem P of System
C. Alphabet soup anyone?
As the SRS was developed, it was realized that reuse was not going to be as easy as had
been thought, and the expectation was lowered to having about 60% of the SRS consist of
reused requirements. This plan did not last either, as when it was released, only about
20-30% of the "shalls" in the Subsytem P SRS document were reused requirements.
As will be shown with the Project S Value Stream Map later in Figure 4.3, the
requirements reuse process was a highly iterative process. It started with the engineers
learning about the specific sections of Subsystem P to which they were assigned and how
they related to the other sections. The engineers then had to review System T's
corresponding SRS in light of what they understood about their section. This allowed
them to analyze which parts of the baseline document could be reused. The final step in
this back-and-forth process was the actual crafting of the requirements. Sometimes this
was as simple as copying a requirement from the System T SRS. However, most
requirements needed changes to fit the new system. Small changes were usually handled
by individual engineers, while larger changes generally required questions to be asked of
other sections within Project S. Sometimes, particular issues arose which required
communication between engineers on this project and those working on different
subsystem SRSs.
4.2.3 Independence of Sections Within Project S
The software in Subsystem P consisted of several sections. Since there was so much
reuse involved in this project, most of the team members were able to work on various
sections of the SRS individually and independently. Sections were assigned so that a
single team member would be responsible for one or more related sections. This nearly-
independent work assignment allowed team members to work without needing frequent
communication.
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4.2.4 Project Re-Baselining
Another interesting aspect of this project is that its schedule and budget were "re-
baselined" during the project. Re-baselining is a process in which the original budget and
schedule, known as the "baseline", are altered considerably to establish a new standard
against which all progress and status should be measured. In this case, the re-baselining
was performed as the original contract budget was reallocated among the various System
C subsystems, and it had a significant impact on the direction and detail of Project S.
The Project S budget dropped 26%from Month 6 to Month 7 as a result of the re-
baselining. While this in itself is not that strange, what is strange is the fact that this new
budget was exceeded before the end of Month 7. Thus, the rest of the project was
running over budget. This fact makes the re-baselining appear illogical
4.2.5 SRS Team
The team of engineers that worked on Project S was different than one might expect for
such a project. Even though this was a requirements development project, there was only
one systems engineer in the group. Normally, one might expect a group developing
requirements to be mostly, if not completely, comprised of systems engineers. This lone
systems engineer was the team leader and served as the "book boss" for the SRS, and was
responsible for delivering the document. The team varied in size over the duration of the
project, from only two, up to eight, and back down to one or two near the end. Besides
the one systems engineer, all the other team members were software engineers.
One of these software engineers was special, in that he had formerly served as the "book
boss" for the System T SRS that served as the basis for requirements reuse. In spite of the
fact that Project S was "Classified" like the System T baseline SRS, the native version of
the SRS could not be easily copied and brought to the facility where the team sat. While
Company X had designed most of System T, the system was technically owned by
Company Y. Due to government regulations regarding "Classified" documents, this
senior engineer had to go to Company Y to view the SRS files. He then had to first
convert the file format of the electronic version of the baseline document, so that there
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were no potential hidden characters in the file. Next, he read each line of the baseline
SRS document twice to check that there was no "Secret" information before
electronically bringing a portion back to the team. This process was intensely time
consuming, and the engineer had many other commitments, so he had to complete this
task over the course of several weeks, reading and transferring as much as he could about
one day per week. Eventually, paper and electronic copies of the entire baseline SRS
document were accessible to the team members.
This senior engineer not only physically obtained this baseline document, but he also had
keen insight into the process that went into creating those requirements. Because he had
been the "book boss" for the baseline document, he was able to offer some degree of
knowledge as to why some requirements had been written as they were. Additionally, he
knew the people involved in that process, so if a particularly difficult question arose, he
knew whom to contact to clarify any confusion.
While there was one highly experienced engineer on the team, there were also two
engineers who had only recently graduated from college. One of these engineers worked
on a section that was closely related to that of the senior engineer. These two had desks
very close to one another, and the senior engineer offered much help to the junior
engineer. The other junior engineer on the team was assigned a rather technically
demanding section that required that he work mostly alone. However, he also had to
work with the "book boss" (remember, the only Systems Engineer) on several issues
relating his section to other sections within Subsystem P and to other SRSs. The rest of
the team had various levels of experience.
While creating the software requirements, most of the team members were also actively
working on the preliminary design for the Subsystem P Software Design Document
(SDD). Some of the preliminary design was required to better understand the
ramifications of the requirements as they were being developed. It also helped them
realize when requirements were not sensible or feasible. They worked more fully on the
preliminary design as the requirements development process was coming to a close.
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Figure 4.2 below shows the number of hours the team worked each month on both the
SRS and SDD. It shows that while the SDD effort began later, the peak in SDD effort
came the month after that of the SRS effort. It is interesting to note that this month was
the month the re-baselining occurred and also when the SRS effort dropped significantly.
Figure 4.2 Requirements Development (SRS) and Preliminary Design (SDD) Hours
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4.2.6 Team Mechanisms
The team used several mechanisms to facilitate the SRS development process. Weekly
meetings were held in which progress and issues encountered were discussed. In each
meeting, individuals shared his or her progress, and reported any issues that required
assistance. Starting around Month 12, the weekly group meetings for Subsystem P were
combined with those of another subsystem. These two groups were related, and it was
determined that their individual design efforts would be helped through improved
communication between the two. Additionally, the other subsystem's development team
had been reduced to a single person, and project management wanted to ensure that this
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individual was continuing to make progress in the proper direction. Even in these
combined meetings, the Subsystem P effort was discussed heavily.
Also helping the team's communication was the fact that most of the team members'
desks were located near one another in a room especially designated for use by the
System C development team (not just for the Subsystem P team). This room was open
only to those who had the proper Security Clearance, and each desk had two computers:
one on a special "Classified" network, and the other on a normal network connection.
"Classified" information is not allowed to be stored on machines that were connected to
the standard network. Having both machines available for use allowed the team members
to easily share "Classified" information with one another while also being able to access
outside "Unclassified" resources.
The team members used a special "Unclassified" software system, which enabled them to
electronically post requirements for others to access, review, and create editing
suggestions. Once their section's requirements were rather stable, each engineer entered
them into a "Classified" software system called DOORS by Telelogic. This system let
them check that all the requirements could be traced back to the A-spec, and kept the
requirements in the form required by the Department of Defense.
The SRS team got a significant amount of feedback from the customer. Government
representatives attended reviews and some weekly meetings. Out of the 40 weekly team
meetings held between Month 2 and Month 14, government representatives were present
at 5. Additionally, they attended the team's "internal" company review (Month 7),
Preliminary Design Review (Month 10), and Interim Review (Month 11), providing
feedback on several issues each time. In accordance with the government contract, the
team was required to submit a draft version of their SRS to the government 45 days prior
to the PDR. The government representatives reviewed the SRS as it was, and offered 73
official comments to the group. These comments were divided into three categories: A,
B, and C. Category A comments were those that were critical and had to be addressed
before the PDR. Categories B and C were comments that needed to be addressed but
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were not as important as those in Category A. Some of these comments requested
additional capability or clarification of the requirements text, while others pointed out
specific errors. The group resolved all Category A comments and several Category B
and C comments before the PDR by either changing the SRS or denying the comments.
The government representatives also offered 41 detailed comments to the team at the
Interim Review, which were resolved by the SRS release in Month 14.
4.3 Value Stream Map
A Product Development Value Stream Map was created to examine the SRS creation
process. The following discusses the Project S process and its overall value. Next, the
PDVSM is presented and discussed, and each of the tasks in the PDVSM is analyzed for
how it adds value to the process or SRS product. Creating this map enabled
understanding of the relationship between the tasks the flow of information in this
process.
4.3.1 Value Proposition
One should not attempt to create a map the flow of value within a process using a
PDVSM without first understanding the value of the process as a whole. The value of
Project S is not simply definable by one sentence; various stakeholders value it
differently. The goal of the Project S SRS development process is to translate customer
needs into specific, well-written requirements that will enable the further development of
Subsystem P by using some requirements previously created for other programs and by
creating other new requirements. To understand the value of this effort, one must look at
how it adds value to each of the sets of stakeholders in this product development effort.
One cannot decipher the stakeholder value without also understanding the context within
which this effort is taking place. Figure 4.3 below is similar to Figure 4.1 in that it
illustrates the context within which Project S lies, but it offers a better insight into how
the various stakeholders perceive the value created by Project S.
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The highest level of Project S is the System C Effort, which includes both hardware and
software elements. The stakeholders most interested in the outcome of the System C
Effort are the Customer and the Program Management Office. The Customer is most
interested in getting a useful, functional, and reliable system at an acceptable price. The
Program Management Office is most interested in making sure that this system is
delivered to maximize the customer value. Delivering a successful System C will prove
Company X's capabilities and could affect future contracts (which mean more money for
the company), thereby offering some value to all Company X employees and
stockholders.
Figure 4.3 Project S Context and Stakeholders
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The Customer, System Architect, and Program Management Office are interested in the
Software System Development, since it offers them value. The System Architect is
responsible for ensuring that System C will operate well and thus provide value to the
Program Management Office, and Customer. Since the software plays a huge part in the
operation of System C, a successful Software System Development will offer value to
each of these three.
When looking specifically at Project S, there are several sets of stakeholders. First, the
various SRS "book bosses" are stakeholders in the outcome of the Project S SRS
outcome. Within the Software System Effort, there are eight different software
subsystems, and some interactions between these exist. Thus the "book bosses" are
interested in how the requirements from each subsystem interact and affect their
respective sections. Of course, the Project S SRS "book boss" is very interested in the
outcome of this SRS effort, for he is ultimately responsible for it. Secondly, the Project S
Employees extract value from the SRS development in the form of job satisfaction and
lessons learned. They also get compensated for the execution of the work and are
therefore very interested in the effort. Specifically, those that must perform the software
design of Subsystem P are very interested in the outcome of the SRS effort, because the
quality of the SRS will dictate how easy the design effort will be. Software Subsystem P
is crucial for the operation of System C. The Customer holds a vested interest in the
Project S SRS development because they want to make sure that all of their needs are
well translated into actionable requirements so that this subsystem can be effectively
designed.
To summarize, the value of Project S is relative to the level within which it is viewed. It
is not as simple as saying "X is the value of Project S and that is it." While there is no
single definition of the value of the process, most stakeholders were interested in the
value from translating the customer needs into specific, well-written requirements that
will enable the further development of the Subsystem P.
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4.3.2 SRS Development Value Stream Map
The PDVSM created for the SRS development effort is shown on the following pages as
Figure 4.4. The map consists of boxes, circles, and arrows between them. The boxes and
circles represent tasks and product reviews. The arrows represent the flow of information
between tasks. The SRS process flows from left to right, and the map is divided by
month.
The process began with the creation of the Draft A-Spec, which led the team to creating
an outline for the SRS. This outline was reviewed and then broken into sections and
assigned to the team's engineers. The team then went through the main value-adding
step of creating the first set of new and reused requirements (more on this later). Each
section was then reviewed by another team member, and they were then all integrated.
The requirements were entered into DOORS, and a supposedly "internal" peer review of
the SRS (which was attended by the "book bosses" of the other SRSs and customer
representatives) was held. After action items from this review were addressed, a draft of
the Project S SRS was submitted to the customer for review approximately 45 days prior
to the Preliminary Design Review. This submission enabled the customer to generate
comments regarding the draft. These comments were addressed and presented at the
PDR. More updates and two more reviews were held before SRS was first officially
released in Month 14. The SRS was considered rather stable and was released at a level
of maturity known as "Revision -" (or "Rev -") just before the completion of this
thesis. Any subsequent changes to the document must pass through a review board. The
next versions of the SRS will be known as "Revision draft", "Revision Final". Thus,
"Rev -- " is just the first fully complete draft of the SRS and is considered the first
product output from Project S.
Other than using boxes and circles with arrows, the map does not follow the format given
in the PDVSM Manual. Cycle Times and In-Process Times for each task were not taken.
Also, the type of value added has not been indicated on the map: this is saved for the
value analysis. Additionally, some frequently-occurring and ongoing tasks are
represented by long bars on the map, which one would not find in the PDVSM format.
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Moreover, circular arrows on this map indicate the reciprocal flow of information
between tasks. In some cases, the circular arrows cannot be drawn, and a pair of straight
arrows serves to indicate this type of flow. Also, starburst shapes indicate non-value
added tasks. A dotted line runs along the left and top of the map to act as the Project S
boundary. All tasks above and to the left of the line were performed by people outside of
Project S. These tasks also impacted other subsystem developments, and information
flows across this border are indicated by blue arrows.
Finally, the main value-adding part of this process is illustrated in a format that is not at
all recommended by the PDVSM Manual. Shown spanning Months 3-6, this set of steps
includes the analysis of the legacy requirements and creation of the SRS requirements.
This sub-process is represented by a large circle divided into wedges according to the
tasks: "Learn About Section & its Relation to Other Sections", "Analyze Legacy
Requirements for Reusability", and "Copy/Generate/Update Requirements". Behind this
circle run bars that represent the various independent sections of the SRS development,
for each had to go through this iterative process. These tasks are illustrated within a
circle because there was no distinct linear order in which these steps occurred. In the
initial iterations of the map these steps were represented in a linear progression, but the
"book boss" declared that to be non-representative of reality. In other words, the way
that this information flowed among the tasks necessitated the shape shown in Figure 4.4.
As they learned about their respective sections, the engineers were better able to
understand what parts of the legacy requirements were suitable for reuse. As they figured
out what was reusable, they either copied the legacy requirement, edited said requirement
to fit the new system, or created new requirements that might serve a similar purpose. In
order to create new requirements, the engineers had to learn more about their system. In
copying and updating legacy requirements, the engineers gained a better understanding of
the legacy document, and therefore understood its reusability more. Thus, information
flowed in both directions among all three of these separate tasks. The result of these
three tasks is the primary value of Project S: initial requirements reuse and requirement
development.
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Figure 4.4 Project S Value Stream Map
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Figure 4.4 Project S Value Stream Map (continued)
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4.3.3 Mapping Effort
The PDVSM effort was carried out in a series of steps. First, after several interviews
with the "book boss", I learned about the project as a whole, the Project S context, who
the members of the team were, what sections each of them worked with, and what types
of resources the team had at its disposal. Unstructured interviews were then conducted
with each member of the team to learn how they viewed their own section, how they
viewed its relation to the other sections, and how they interacted with other members of
the team. I also attended several of the team's weekly meetings to gain a better
understanding of the issues they faced and how the team interacted.
Using the information gathered in the interviews and meetings, a rudimentary hand-
drawn PDVSM was created. The author created six iterations of the map before
presenting it to the "book boss" for critiquing. After a couple of back-and-forth
meetings, it was realized that the representation of the reuse cycle (which at the time was
illustrated as a strictly linear process) had to be different. A final hand-drawn map was
completed, and then an electronic copy was made using OmniGraffle Professional
software. A printout of the electronic PDVSM was reviewed by the "book boss", and
approved. Slowly, small changes have been continually recommended, resulting in
several versions of the electronic map being created.
4.3.4 Value Analysis
Using a value analysis framework developed by Josef Oehmen (2005), which is based on
Robert Slack's decomposition of customer value, I analyzed the value of each of the tasks
in the process. Oehmen's framework breaks down how a task adds value: by
contributing either to the time, cost, or quality of the product and/or the development
process. Table 4.1 shows this value analysis for Project S.
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Table 4.1 Project S PDVSM Value Analysis
Task Process/ Time Cost QualityProduct
Get Reuse & Process Provides schedule Reuse dictates #
Process Marching for project hours to be worked
Orders on shalls
Assemble Team Process Determines # &
pay grade of people
=> cost of SRS ___________
Obtain System H Process Enables reuse to
SRS begin
Draft SRS Outline Product & Breakdown enables Gives a structure for
Process one to see when building the SRS
effort needed
Review SRS Product Ensures SRS is Ensures SRS is Ensures quality of
Outline doable in time doable in budget Outline
allowed allowed
"Book Boss" Does Process Gives better Discovers potential
First Pass on All understanding of stumbling blocks early
Sections the work to be
done; helps divide
work to get job
done on time
Estimate Section Process Divides work to
Needs ensure on-time
delivery
Sections Assigned Process Divides work to
ensure on-time
delivery
Reuse Basis Process [Had major Requires usage of reuse
Changed negative impact- basis more closely
non-value added] aligned with System C
Get Info About Process Adds to engineer's
Each Section knowledge for reuse
assessment
Get Info from Process Adds to engineer's
Other Sections knowledge for reuse
and SRSs assessment
Obtain System T Process Enables reuse to
SRS begin
Learn About Process Engineer knows what
Section and Its section needs are, better
Relation to Other able to write req'ts
Sections
Analyze Legacy Process If reusable, saves If reusable, saves Determines what doesn't
Requirements for time money need to be written newly;
Reusability offers a set of already
complete req'ts
Copy/Generate/ Product Actually creates the
Update product!!!!!
Requirements
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Task Process/ Time Cost QualityProduct
Unofficial Peer Product & Determines what Checks product quality
Review Process needs to be worked
on in the future
Weekly Team Product Fine schedule Discuss progress;
Meetings adjustments as identify & resolve
necessary issues; generate
cohesiveness among
independently-working
team
Analyze & Update Product Continually improves the
Most Recent SRS product quality;
Requirements allows identification of
other improvements
Work on Software Product & Enables team to
Design Document Process understand ramifications
of requirements
decisions; encourages &
enables team to make
better product
Integrate Sections Product & Collects everything
Process together; makes product
into single item for first
time; allows all to be
seen together
Wordsmith & Product Checks minor quality
Format issues; begins putting
product in final format
Identify Product Improves quality
Weaknesses
Check Process NOTHING-Putting
Traceability requirements into
DOORS will do this!
Put SRS into Product & Put product into final
DOORS Process format; important for
execution of rest of
Project; important to
customer; ensures SRS
will not deviate from A-
Spec; ensures quality
"Internal Peer Product Assesses schedule Assesses cost to Checkss quality;
Review" to complete finish project identifies action items to
Project. Can improve
redirect if progress
known
Update SRS Product & Redirects process.
Outline Process Improves SRS product.
Address Action Product Improve quality
Items
Integrate Sections Product & Collects changes; creates
Process updated unified
document
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Task Process/ Time Cost Quality
Product
Deliver Paper Process Contractual
Copies to Data requirement to
Manager deliver to customer
Get Signatures Product Checks quality (forced
management review)
Customer Product Required task; allows for
Delivery (45 Days feedback from customer
Prior to PDR)
Close out most Product Improve quality
TBDs
(issues To Be
Decided)
Customer Reply Product Checks quality, Figure
(73 comments) out how to improve
Respond to Product Resolves major quality
Category A issues
Comments
PDR Prep Process Makes PDR smoother
Preliminary Product & Checks status; Checks status; Checks quality; get more
Design Review Process determines how determines how items for improvement
much time needed much $$$ needed
to complete to complete
Respond to Product Resolves minor quality
Category B & C issues
Comments
Update SRS Product Improves quality
Interim Review Product & Checks status; Checks status; Check quality; get more
Process determines how determines how items for improvement
much time needed much $$$ needed
to complete to complete
Customer Reply Product Check quality, Figure
(41 comments) out how to improve
Respond to Product Improves quality
Customer
Comments
Get Final Input Product Improves quality
From Sections
Final SRS Product Improves quality
Updates
Final Review Product Checks schedule Checks budget Final quality check
status, especially status, especially
relative to prelim & relative to prelim &
detail design. detail design.
"Rev -" Release Product Product Delivered; all
subsequent changes must
pass through
configuration control:
assures quality
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4.4 Project S Earned Value Management System Data
The following section explains the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data that
Company X used to track the progress of Project S. It shows how they think value was
earned during the project. The EVMS data is based upon the Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS) created by the System C leadership team and passed down to the Project S "book
boss". This WBS broke Project S down into nine tasks. Each month, the completion
percentage for each task was estimated and reported as the earned value (EV; remember,
out of 1.0) claimed. The EV was then accumulated across the tasks to create one set of
EVMS data for each month. This data was passed on to the System C leadership team so
they could ascertain the overall system development status. The Project S EVMS cost
account manager was responsible for handling the EVMS data. She was very helpful in
providing access to very many EVMS data files and explaining them. Digesting and
analyzing the data was aformidable task, requiring an iterative trial-and-error approach.
This data is presented below after a brief explanation of the task break down. Table 4.2
below provides a refresher of the terms used in EVMS.
Table 4.2 EVMS Refresher
Acronym Full Name My Layman's Terms Formula
EVMS Management System a way to keep track of project progress" N/A
Work Breakdown "a division of the project into smallerWBS tasks that can be completed by the teams N/AStructure assigned to them"
BCWS Budgeted Cost of "what should get done in the time N/AWork Scheduled scheduled"
BCWP Budgeted Cost of "what actually got done" N/AWork Performed
ACWP Actual Cost of Work "what it cost to actually perform the N/APerformed work"
SV Schedule Variance "how much was completed relative to SV= BCWP - BCWS
what was expected"
CV Cost Variance "how much it cost to do what was C=CPAWcomplete relative to what was expected" V BCWP - ACWP
SPI Schedule "normalized measure of how far away SPI BCWP/BCWSPerformance Index from the schedule the task is"
CP1 Cost Performance "normalized measure of how far away CPI BCWP/ACWPIndex from the budget the task is"
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4.4.1 Project S Earned Value Management System Data
To understand the EVMS data, one must understand how the project's earned value was
counted. The WBS for Project S divided the SRS development into nine distinct tasks:
1) Analysis of Legacy Requirements
2) Update document outline to include new/added functionality
3) Increment 1 Shall development
4) Increment 2 Shall development
5) Increment 3 Shall development
6) Document Review and Release
7) Increment 4 Shall development
8) Increment 5 Shall development
9) Document Review and Release
Task 1 describes the reviewing of System H's SRS document to create an outline for the
Project S SRS, as well as the analyzing of the System H requirements to determine which
apply to Project S and then adding them to the new SRS. Obviously, this had to be
repeated for System T once the reuse basis was changed. Task 2 is the updating of the
outline created in Task 1 to reflect those aspects that make System C differ from System
H. Tasks 3,4,5,7, and 8 represented the creation of new "shalls" for the SRS book. Task
6 represented the review and release of data to the government customer 45 days prior to
PDR. Task 9 represents the release of the SRS to "Rev -".
The way that "earned value" was assigned to these tasks was interesting. Obviously, for
Tasks 6 and 9 to be considered complete, a review must be held and the corresponding
document must be released. Similarly, Task 2 was considered complete when a review
was held for the SRS Outline. It was assumed that at the end of Task 1, all the reused
requirements would be added to the SRS. Tasks 3,4,5,7, and 8 were each to be
considered complete when a certain number of new "shalls" had been written and added
to the SRS book. The number of new "shalls" for each task is represented below in
Figure 4.5 as a fraction of the total expected number of SRS "shalls".
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Figure 4.5 Division of New "Shalls" Among Tasks
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Figure 4.6 above shows the earned value claimed each month for each task. For instance,
the first 5% of Task 1 was completed in Month 1, 70% of it was done in Month 2, and the
remaining 25% was finished in Month 3. These tasks were mostly reported as complete
in order, and each month (except Month 6) one task dominated the total monthly EV
claimed. Figure 4.7 shows the same data, but with the EV accumulated such that one can
more easily see how the total project EV amassed. It makes it perfectly clear that in
Month 8 much more value had been earned than in Month 4 (as is expected).
Figure 4.7 Project S Cumulative Task Earned Value
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Figure 4.8 below shows the Project S BCWS, BCWP, and ACWP for each month. The
numbers are graphed as a percentage of the original Project S budget in order to mask the
real numbers. The schedule and cost information for all of the tasks was combined to get
this EVMS data. Several facts can be taken from this graph that illustrates the overall
health of the project. As of Month 10, the team had not achieved what they were
scheduled to do. In fact, it was not until Month 7 that they even came within 10% of
catching up to schedule. In Month 5, the team was 41% behind schedule. The Month 6
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re-baselining is evident, as it caused the cumulative BCWS to actually drop as the
monthly BCWS went from 22% to 3%. Normally this could not happen, as you would
never expect less to be done after Month 6 than after Month 5. Regardless of who your
coworkers are, it's hard for most engineering teams to do negative work. Also readily
evident from this figure is the gross overrun of cumulative ACWP relative to BCWP.
The team was over budget from the beginning of the project, and the cost performance
only improved during the month of the re-baselining. This poor budget performance
suggests either a large misjudgment in estimating the amount of time to perform the
budgeted work, or that the team performed poorly. Another interesting point is that with
the exception of Month 6, it cost the team more to do the work than was expected by a
considerable margin. That means that every month, the team got more over budget. In
Month 6 however, the team managed to do much more than planned (as they caught up to
schedule) but spent less money in doing so than was expected.
Figure 4.8
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Figure 4.9 Project S Performance Indices
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Figure 4.10 shows the project's cost and schedule performance indices (CPI and SPI),
which represent the relation between BCWP & ACWP and BCWP & BCWS,
respectively. Other than in Months 10 and 11, the project was behind schedule and over
budget. In fact, only in one month did the CPI exceed 1.0, but at no point was it within
20% of the nominal value. Excluding Months 10 and 11, the project was always nearly
40% away from the optimal CPI value! While the CPI was nearly always far below
optimal, after the re-baselining, the monthly SPI shot up and then returned to near the
monthly optimal level. The incredibly high SPI in Months 6 and 7 shot the cumulative
SPI from 0.44 to 0.92, and after this the project stayed within 10% of the optimal
cumulative SPI. By Month 10, the team had nearly caught up to the prescribed
cumulative and monthly schedules, but never got where it needed to be.
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4.5 Comparison of EVMS and PDVSM
Two definitions of the value of Project S have been presented. The EVMS information
shows how Company X's System C Leadership Team thinks Project S adds value, and
the value stream mapping and analysis presents an outsider's view of the process and its
value. It is interesting to compare the two to see how they align.
Shown below are two figures that show a lot of information. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show
monthly and cumulative EVMS data (respectively) laid over a small version of the value
stream map. This EVMS data includes the EV data claimed for each of the tasks, as well
as the project's overall BCWP and ACWP for each month. These graphs show how the
actual process represented by the value stream map does not align with the EVMS data.
The EVMS data does not correspond perfectly with the VSM drafted. Too much earned
value has been claimed early in the project, as draft versions of "shalls" had been added
to the SRS but counted as if they were final versions. By Month 9, nearly all of the value
of the project has been claimed, but there was still much work left to do. Because there
was more work to do than there was value to officially earn, the team stopped using
EVMS for the remainder of the project. As a result of their overzealous EV claims early
in the project, the team needed to "unearn" value to properly continue using EVMS. This
fact highlights a flaw in the EVMS system-one cannot claim negative value to correct
previous errors.
Several other incongruities exist between the two value methods. First, while the EVMS
data seems to indicate that Task 1, the "Analysis of Legacy Requirements" was complete
by Month 3, the truth is that the team was still looking back at the baseline documents
well into Months 9 and 10. Reviewing the legacy requirements and reusing "shalls" was
a much more difficult task than initially thought, but the EV was claimed early. Also,
while the PDVSM indicates that Task 2 should have been complete in Month 2 instead of
Month 3, the truth is that there was some lingering aspects of the SRS outline creation
that are not reflected on the map. Furthermore, Month 10 appears to be a very productive
month, with 90% of Task 5 and 75 % of Task 7 earned value being claimed. However,
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less ACWP was charged that month than had been since Month 3 or would be until
Month 8. This could be an artifact of the team claiming work in Month 6 that had been
nearly finished in Month 5 but not complete or due to the re-baselining. Alternatively,
the Section Integration activity in Month 10 collected many "shalls" that had been
previously created. Once assembled, they were officially part of the SRS and more easily
counted and aligned. Thus, it was easier to claim the requirements as being complete.
Some aspects of the EVMS data do make sense with respect to the PDVSM. Task 6, the
review and release of the draft SRS was mostly claimed in Month 7 (when then review
was held), with less being claimed in Month 8 (when the release was). Additionally, it
makes sense that tasks 2-5 should be claimed mostly during the big requirements reuse
cycle (even though these tasks were supposed to be analyzing the reused requirements
and not creating new ones).
Overall, there is some overlap between how EVMS and PDVSM measure the value of
Project S, but they are very difficult to compare outright. The way Project S has been
broken down into tasks in this case has very little to do with how the project was
executed. While the division of tasks created for estimating project progress seems to be
rather straightforward, it does not adequately represent how each task was performed. It
ultimately led to the EVMS data being less than perfectly useful for understanding the
value of the project. According to the Project S "book boss", the Earned Value
Management System was used rather loosely. Essentially at the end of each month, his
boss asked him "How much progress have you made and how many "shalls" are in the
SRS?". The real progress of the task was not represented by the EVMS data, and this is
one of the main reasons for the lack on congruity between the two value perspectives.
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Figure 4.12 Project S Monthly EV, BCWP, and ACWP Superimposed on PDVSM
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Figure 4.13 Project S Cumulative EV, BCWP, ACWP Superimposed on PDVSM
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4.6 Conclusions
Project S has been successful from a quality standpoint. It was the first of the eight
software subsystem SRSs submitted for customer delivery and it was one of the first ones
to be released to "Rev -". All customer comments have been addressed and the
customer is satisfied with Project S product. From a schedule and budget standpoint,
however, the project has underperformed. As is evident from almost every EVMS graph,
the number of hours the project took to complete was far larger than what was expected
and planned for. This is most likely due to underestimating the work involved with the
reuse effort, and to the fact that Project S was not as good of a candidate for reuse as was
thought.
Also, the tasks from the WBS do not align well with the PDVSM. While the value
stream map is certainly not perfect, it better reflects how value was added to the project
than does the EVMS task list. The EVMS task breakdown is based upon number of
"shalls" in the book. While this is a simple, understandable metric, it is perhaps not the
best way to break down the process value.
A couple of problems arise with just using the number of SRS "shalls" to estimate
process value. First, while a "shall" may be in the book, it may have many outstanding
issues to be resolved. Thus, value may be claimed on a certain number of "shalls", but if
not a single one of them has been resolved completely, then there is still plenty of value
left to be earned. Additionally, in Month 6 there was what seemed to be an explosion of
productivity. This seeming great work output is deceptive, because it was during this
month that the "shalls" from the various engineers were assimilated into one document,
and thereby a large number of "shalls" was reported. Most of these "shalls" probably
existed in some form before this month, but were not claimed because they were not in
the book. And again, not all of those "shalls" claimed as value in this time frame were
complete. Many needed resolution, and the resolution of issues takes time and
communication. Having so many issues to resolve was one major cause of the Project S
SRS slipping its "Rev -" release date from Month 11 to Month 14.
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Overall the project was both successful and unsuccessful in terms of customer value,
depending upon how one views it. From a quality point of view, it met all expectations,
but from schedule and cost perspectives, it underperformed. Additionally, the way the
value of Project S was measured by the EVMS led to problems and overestimating actual
progress. Hopefully, though, by taking their time with the SRS development, Company X
will be able to produce a better quality Subsystem P and System C.
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5 Project R: Hardware Prototype Development
5.1 Introduction
In this project, engineers worked to create a hardware prototype for a single antenna from
a multi-antenna communication and radar system. This radar system will be incorporated
into a much larger and more complex system (which itself is in the design stage). This
project was much more complex and lasted longer than Project S. Because it is so large,
only portions of its value stream map have been chosen for analysis.
5.2 Project R Context
Project R must be understood in relation to its context. This requires a careful
examination of the program structure from multiple angles because of its complexity.
Project R is the development of a single antenna for a communications system prototype,
which is part of a much larger spiral development process. Spiral development involves
iterations of design, production, and testing to make a final system that performs better
than a single design process might. It implies a high degree of parallelism in the early
stages, and accepts inherent inefficiencies as the overall system definition, partitioning,
and concepts evolve together. As indicated below in Figure 5.1, a family of three
different systems (D, E, & F) are to be designed, built, and fielded in a very long and
expensive spiral development process. Several new technologies are needed to field all
of these systems, and these technologies are being developed as prototypes within the
development of System D. These prototypes, henceforth referred to as System D
Prototypes, or SDPs, are multi-million dollar development efforts themselves.
Information from testing the SDPs will be fed into the final design of System D. After
System D has been built and fielded, lessons from it and from the SDPs will be used in
the design of System E. Similarly, lessons from the SDPs and both Systems D and E will
be fed into the development of System F. The development and manufacture of System D
will take many years to complete (Systems E and F will not be complete for decades),
and various parts of its development will inevitably serve as the basis of many theses.
This chapter only presents a small sliver of the System D development effort.
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Figure 5.1 System D Spiral Development Context
Project R is a subset of one of the SDPs being created for System D. Figure 5.2 below
indicates how Project R is a part of System D Prototype I. SDP I is a mock-up of
Subsystem I, the housing that will incorporate many antennas. Some of these antennas
only transmit signals, some only receive, and some do both. SDP I will be tested with to
see to what extent the antennas interfere electromagnetically with one another. The goal
of Project R is to design, build, and test one of the many SDP I antennas, Antenna N,
prior to its integration with the others for the full SDP I testing.
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Figure 5.2 Project R Context
5.3 Project R Specifics
5.3.1 Team Structure
The Project R team consisted of many highly-specialized engineers working in six major
groups. Each group consisted of one group leader and 5 to 15 engineers. The size of
each group varied over time depending on workload demands. One overall Project R
leader was responsible for the team, and he met regularly with the group leaders.
The six groups involved were the analog & radio frequency (A/RF) electronics group, the
controller software group, the controller hardware group, the power group, the
mechanical engineering group, and the procurement group.
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The A/RF electronics group was essentially the lead group for the project. They created
the overall architecture for Antenna N and designed the individual radiating elements of
the antenna, along with most of the chips and other electronics needed for properly
combining and conditioning the signal taken in through the antenna. It was also the A/RF
group's responsibility to review the system level performance requirements for realism,
provide feedback in support of system-level trades, allocate and derive lower-level
requirements and performance budgets consistent with both top-level constraints and
design/manufacturing capabilities, and to perform crucial electromagnetic analysis in
support of architecture decisions. The team leader was also the group leader for this
group.
The controller is a very important and complex part of Antenna N. It allows the
thousands of individual radiators making up the surface of the antenna to be
electronically "steered" to receive energy coming from a specific moving source at a
particular position within the scan volume. The radiators do not physically move;
instead, the electromagnetic signal from each radiator is selectively phase-shifted and
combined to construct a beam in the desired direction. Both software and hardware
portions of the controller are required to achieve this complex task. The controller
development was therefore executed by two groups, one for the software and one for the
hardware. There was a single controller behind all of the A/RF electronics that controlled
the most of the antenna, but some portions of the controller hardware were distributed
within the other Antenna N electronics. This approach provides maximum performance
and minimum computing resources with only a slight increase in system complexity.
The power group was responsible for providing the proper amount of power to the
antenna at the right voltage and current levels and with the proper conditioning. They had
to make sure that the power was directed and distributed correctly within all the
electronics.
The mechanical engineering group was responsible for determining the physical
arrangement and interconnection of all the parts of the antenna, its electronics, its support
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structure, and the coolant system. They did analysis work on the various hardware
subassemblies, and also produced all the drawings and diagrams for production.
The procurement group was responsible for obtaining materials and parts from vendors.
They had to establish relationships with the vendors, obtain quotes for all materials and
parts, integrate and manage the part delivery schedules, and ensure that the delivered
parts functioned according to requirements. They also built some of the components for
the SDP antenna that required rapid turn-around.
5.3.2 Communication
Program information and design data was communicated to individuals through the team
hierarchy. The Project R leader met with all the group leaders at a weekly meeting,
where major issues were often discussed. The team leader and the group leaders used a
Microsoft Project schedule for managing the tasks involved in the project. When major
Project R subsystems required communication between groups, individual engineers met
with members of other groups as necessary, independent of the group leaders. Each
group had its own internal weekly (at least) meeting. The members of the groups
generally sat near one another. They mainly communicated face-to-face or over phone or
email, and often exchanged large electronic data files. Shared network drives were used
for storing the data shared within and among the individual groups.
5.3.3 Project Issues
In this complex project, many issues arose that impacted the project and ultimately led to
its restructuring. From the date of the contract award, controversy surrounding the bid
evaluation process delayed the program start by several months; however, the antenna
delivery date was not allowed to change. This resulted in a severely compressed
schedule before the work even began. Other major issues specific to Project R included
the fluctuating antenna requirements, the "deliverable" status of the antenna, the interplay
between the design of the SDP version of the antenna and the production version, the
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"common equipment", the repeated de-scoping of the SDP antenna size, the "Plan B" to
mitigate risk, and budget problems.
5.3.3.1 Antenna Requirements
Much to the dismay of the engineers working on Project R, agreement on a set of top-
level requirements for the antenna was not reached until late in the design cycle. The
engineers were given suggested overall performance capabilities, along with some high-
level requirements for the antenna, but gaps in the specification lingered throughout the
design phase. By the antenna Preliminary Design Review (PDR), the team had received
only what were called "good enough requirements", but these were incomplete at best.
For example, a number of performance parameters were listed as To Be Determined
(TBD). Determining these parameters often required decision to be made at higher levels
of the System D design or by the customer technical experts, or had to be vetted by many
different groups across the program and across the country. This process was slow, and
was often trumped by short-term crises that had higher visibility. As a result, the various
groups were updating the requirements for their parts of the antenna until the antenna
Critical Design Review (CDR). The requirements for each of the groups should have
been settled before the Advanced Design Review (ADR). Fortunately, by designing the
SDP version of the antenna, the team had a good start creating a set of requirements for
the production version.
Many major requirements changes came from higher levels within Company X or the
System D leadership as the overall vision for System D changed. These changes
included an added requirement that the antenna support communication with an
additional class of sources, major geometrical and configuration changes to Subsystem I,
and operating system changes for the controller software.
The fluctuation in the requirements led to many changes and rework over the course of
the antenna development. These changes often occurred so rapidly that it was difficult if
not impossible for the formal plan documentation to keep pace. Not surprisingly, the
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ultimate result of these changes was that the project was behind schedule and over budget
as compared to the original baseline.
5.3.3.2 "Deliverable" Status
Throughout Project R, there was a constant debate among the team lead, the System D
leadership, and the Company X leadership about whether or not Antenna N was
"deliverable". The term "deliverable" carries with it a very specific meaning with respect
to government contracts, and such product require a great deal of care in their design,
manufacture, and testing. Usually, a piece of hardware is considered "deliverable" if it is
a production item which is considered to be in final, full-functional shape. Since Antenna
N was going to be integrated with SDP I for testing at a customer facility, some people
thought that Antenna N was "deliverable"; others, however, felt that since it was just a
prototype, it was not to be considered "deliverable" but merely "shippable". Further, the
original expectations of those planning the antenna design never included the added effort
that accompanies a "deliverable" product. The debate raged on, but no strong decision
was ever made. However, a de facto decision emerged, as the fight against the
"deliverable" status was eventually given up. Essentially, although no formal decision
had been made, the customer expectations gradually increased until the program office
directed the team to proceed as if Antenna N were "deliverable".
Making Antenna N "deliverable" led to a great deal of work. Drawings had to be
updated formally to reflect any deviations from the design, stenciling and paperwork had
to be redone, and a more rigorous regimen of quality inspections and approvals were
demanded for the antenna. The impacts of this decision were fel by all six groups.
Additionally, this "deliverable" status led to CDR being a much more difficult process
than originally planned. In the initial project planning, the CDR was going to be a single-
day internal review where System D technical experts and program leadership could
review the Antenna N status and identify any loose ends to be tied up. However, the
debate over the "deliverable" status of Antenna N led to the program office elevating the
CDR to a customer-level review. The customer presence meant that Company X had to
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add internal meetings to review the design information prior to the customer seeing it.
First, each group held their own peer review to collect their information. Next, there was
a week-long Company X internal review. Due to customer schedule issues, a month
passed before the customer CDR. Overall, the CDR ballooned from just a peer review
and one-day internal CDR to a massive two weeks of review, one-month delay, and then
a three day "dog and pony show" for the customer.
5.3.3.3 SDP Antenna vs. Production Antenna
The team of engineers that worked on creating the SDP version of Antenna N (Project R)
also worked on creating the production version as well. As planned, the team was to
work on a single design, and then break it into the SDP and production versions once an
acceptable design freeze point was reached. These separate designs would be done in
parallel, and after the SDP testing was complete, lessons would be fed back into the
production design. Unfortunately, an adequate design freeze point was never reached,
and thus the engineers worked primarily on the SDP version (Project R), and then on the
production version after Project R ended. This change of plans is indicated below in
Figure 5.3. In order to avoid any confusion, all further references to the antenna will be
to the SDP version of the antenna. This prototype is the focus of Project R. Any
reference to the production version of the antenna will be specified.
Plan
Begin Production
Design Design
SDP
Design
Actual
Begin Production
Design Design
SDP Production
Design Design
Figure 5.3 Relationship Between SDP and Production Versions of Antenna N
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5.3.3.4 "Common Equipment"
As well as designing and building Antenna N for the SDP I testing, several of the
engineers on the Project R team worked on supporting equipment for SDP I. This
equipment that they were designing was to be common among all of the antennas in the
SDP I testing and was developed concurrently. Thus, many of the engineers had to work
on both Project R and the "common equipment" design at the same time (with the
common equipment design requiring a great deal of interface with the companies
developing the other antennas). The common equipment design effort has been excluded
from this chapter, but it unquestionably added to the engineers' workload.
5.3.3.5 De-Scoping of Antenna Size
The final production version of Antenna N for Subsystem I is planned to be very large
and contain thousands of radiators. For the SDP, however, it was considered unnecessary
to make Antenna N full-sized. Originally, it was planned to have about 25% of the
radiators of the production antenna. In other words, Antenna N would have 3 times as
much empty surface as it would have covered with active radiators. Prior to the ADR,
the requirement was changed to having only 20% active elements. This was requested by
the design team and was necessary because of the architecture partitioning. It had no
impact on the system performance or design effort because it occurred early in the
development. After the CDR, it was further reduced to 13% active antenna. This was a
change directed to the design team by the System D's system engineering group as a
result of more detailed performance analysis and projected cost information. When
Project R ended, Antenna N was set to have just 6% of the number of active radiators that
the production version would have. This also resulted from updated analysis and further
attempts to reduce overall non-recurring cost. These changes in the scope of the product
forced the Antenna N team to adapt, especially the mechanical engineers working on the
structure.
5.3.3.6 Plan B
The preliminary design of Antenna N called for the design of a new kind of a specific
circuit and a novel system architecture. This new architecture and circuit promised
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improvements over previous designs, but there was some risk that the new circuit and
architecture would not be feasible. To mitigate this risk, Project R began a more
traditional approach as a "Plan B" after the PDR. In "Plan B", the groups assessed what
would have to change if the new architecture and circuit could not be used. For most
groups, this meant that new parts had to be designed in parallel with the "Plan A" parts.
Since this additional effort was not anticipated in the original plan, this obviously had an
adverse effect on the team's productivity and artificially skewed the earned value reports.
5.3.3.7 Problems with Vendors
Project R suffered significantly from vendors that were unable to deliver the quality and
quantity of product as their quotes had claimed. In the case of one major part, the
relationship with the vendor was ultimately severed, and a new vendor had to be found
quickly. Also, the manufacturer of one of the major Antenna N subassemblies was
forced to modify its normal production processes to meet customer-directed schedule cuts
that occurred well after the detailed manufacturing plans were in place. The risks were
identified and communicated up to the leadership hierarchy. In the end, the risks were
realized and units were being produced at a rate less than half of that planned, and. This
fact contributed to the aforementioned 13%--> 6% active antenna change as well.
5.3.3.8 Re-Baselining
Approximately halfway through the program, the customer requested significant
additional scope changes and asked Company X to suggest tasks in the baseline plan that
could be eliminated so that the project would remain cost-neutral. As a result, the entire
Project R schedule and budget were re-baselined. Begun in month 10, but not
implemented until month 15, the re-baselining effort left much of the project statusing
efforts in limbo for a time. Budget was reallocated among the Project R tasks, and some
tasks were cut to keep the budget the same. If the team continued following the original
plan, they would have performed some tasks that had no budget or added no value to the
project. During this time, the team was allowed to continue as was deemed prudent, and
each work package's budget was allowed to increase with the money actually spent each
month.
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5.3.3.9 Budget Issues and the Restructuring of Project R
At the highest levels, the evolution of the system concept, performance requirements, and
architecture drove cost into the development effort and risk into the schedule that was
never envisioned in the original plan. Because of the issues discussed in previous
sections, Project R also fell behind schedule and over budget. This was true of many of
the subsystem design activities that rolled up into the System D design effort, and it was
realized that budget had to be cut somewhere. Measurements had recently shown that the
antenna that was most likely to interfere with Antenna N actually had a very low
probability of interference over all of the ranges critical for mission success. Also, a
critical chain analysis had shown that it would be impossible to receive all the parts from
the vendors in time to assemble, integrate, and test Antenna N before the SDP I testing.
These three facts made it obvious that Project R could be stopped and funds conserved
without increasing overall System D technical risk. This led to the end of Project R.
However, this was not the end of the team, as those working on common equipment still
had to deliver a subset of the common equipment for the SDP I testing. Also, due to the
"deliverable" status, all drawings associated with Antenna had to be corrected and
brought up to a very precise standard. The SDP Antenna N design was later used as a
starting point for the production Antenna N design effort.
5.3.4 The Team and I
I had good interaction with members of the team. I met often with the team leader and on
several occasions with the group leaders. Interviews were normally face-to-face, with
phone calls and emails used to answer specific questions. The team was willing to
provide me with a plethora of data relating to how the project proceeded and official
Company X product development processes even if program constraints forced these
processes to be modified. Project data included access to the Microsoft Project files used
to manage the project and analyze the critical chain of development tasks, several
miscellaneous project-specific documents, variance reports, manpower reports, and most
importantly, project EVMS data. If anything, I was given access to too much data.
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5.4 Project R Overall Value Stream Map
A PDVSM was created to examine Project R. In the following sections, the value of
Project S is presented, along with a discussion of the project itself. The PDVSM is
shown, and its tasks are analyzed for their respective value contributions. Through the
process of creating this map, I learned a great deal about the process steps, how they are
related, and how the team worked together.
5.4.1 Value Proposition
Again, prior to creating a PDVSM of a process, one must have a good understanding of
the overall value of the process. Only then can one begin to digest how that value is
created. Project R had several goals that can be used to analyze its value. The first goal
was to create a prototype of Antenna N that could prove the functionality of the novel
architecture and circuitry used to perform the specified communication function.
Another goal of equal or more importance was that the antenna, when integrated with
SDP I, could provide valuable information about how well the SDP as a whole performed
against the test criteria. Finally, Antenna N was to provide information so that the
designers of the production version could have a solid foundation to work from.
Figure 5.2 above is similar to Figure 4.3 in the Project S chapter in that it represents the
context of the project. Instead of altering and repeating Figure 5.2 with just the
stakeholders added to it, I will state the stakeholders for each level of detail.
For the most part the only interested stakeholder in the multi-system development effort
is the customer, who wants to ensure that they get a family of new systems that meet
performance requirements. Those interested in the System D development are the
customer, the program management office, and the system architect. Each finds value in
the development of a system design that is stable enough to allow for further
development and inclusion of the new technologies from the SDP efforts. However, they
also want the system architecture to be flexible enough to function even without some of
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the SDP technologies if they prove untenable. All of these same stakeholders are
interested in the outcomes of each of the SDP technology development efforts.
For the SDP I effort, there are several interested parties. First, the customer, program
management office, and system architect care about the outcome of this important
technology development effort, and how this will affect the System D development.
Second, all of the companies that are making the various antennas for the SDP see value
not only in knowing how well their specific antennas perform, but also in how they
interact with the other antennas and the common equipment. They want to be sure that
their antennas will be placed on the production version of System D. Finally, Company
X is one of these companies, and they also see value in understanding the performance of
the common equipment when integrated with the other antennas.
For Project R, many of the same stakeholders are interested. The customer is interested
in the performance of this specific antenna, as it will provide crucial communications
capability for System D. By creating a functional prototype, Project R provides value to
the customer by giving them confidence that the production antenna will be a success.
Again, Company X wants its antenna to perform well so that it will be easier for it to
design and manufacture the production version to be placed on System D. They also
want to use Project R to refine their ability to produce such antennas and new
architectures. Every opportunity that they have to expand their realm of expertise is
valuable to them. The Project R leader and team members all hold an interest in the
antenna's outcome. For most of them, this project has been their primary work
component, and they would like to see it succeed. It has provided them with many
lessons and taught them a great deal as they have worked on the design and development
of the antenna. Additionally, most of them will be working on the production version of
the antenna, and these lessons learned, coupled with having Antenna N as a basis, will
prove valuable as they begin the production antenna design.
Overall, the value of Project R and its context differs depending upon one's point of
view. The higher-level view of the overall project has fewer major stakeholders, and they
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will not be able to extract their value for years to come. When looking at the project with
sharper resolution, one sees that there are more interested stakeholders, who see value in
the outcome of the prototype antennas and the learning required to create them and their
successors. With the overall value proposition thusly stated, the value stream map can be
better understood, and then the value of the individual tasks can be analyzed.
5.4.2 Project R PDVSM
A shrunken version of the full current-state value stream map for Project R is shown
below in Figure 5.4. Regrettably, a full resolution image of the map is unavailable for
several reasons. First, when printed at the smallest size such that it is legible, it is takes
up 8 sheets of paper (4 wide by 2 tall), and this thesis is not conducive to such a large
format map. The fact that this much space is required to be able to read the map is a
testament to the complexity of Project R. Also, some of the processes in the map refer to
specifics of the project and other Company X proprietary information, which cannot be
published. Finally, the complexity of the project and map are not conducive to being
easily understood. Showing the entire map would most likely be confusing for the
reader. For these reasons, the full map will not be displayed or analyzed in detail in this
thesis. This is a shame because of the great effort that went into making the map.
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Figure 5.4 Shrunken Full Project R Value Stream Map
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Stream Map
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From looking at Figure 5.4, one can figure out the format of the full Project R Value
Stream Map. Tasks are shown as long grey boxes, connected by arrows to indicate the
flow of information (and therefore value, according to Graebsch (2005) and others)
between them. As is usually the case, time flows from left to right, and is broken up into
a timeline consisting of monthly intervals, as Morgan (2002) suggests. The map is also
broken up into six horizontal bands (as Morgan espouses); one for each of the groups
(controller hardware and software, A/RF electronics, procurement, mechanical, and
power) and one for other project management and planning tasks. Tasks and events that
involved more than one group are indicated by tall boxes that stretch across the bands.
Readily apparent are the ADR, PDR, and CDR, which stretch the full height of the map.
A similar box on the far right of the map indicates when the project was essentially shut
down, and a box to the left of the CDR indicates the week-long internal review that
happened a month before CDR.
As discussed, there were several changes to the system requirements and scope, among
other outside influences, which affected the course of the project. Such changes are
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marked by a solid colored vertical line, which represents when the change happened or
was put into place, and which stretch across the bands of the groups that were affected by
each change. Text next to each of these lines indicates what the content of the change
was. Many of these changes caused rework of some tasks, and the tasks that had to be
reworked are indicated by colored circles with arrowheads. The lines and circular arrows
are colored the same for each change.
Figure 5.5 Examples of VSM Formatting Items
Information Flow Related Tasks w/
within Same Group Reciprocal
Information Flow
6000I
Requirements or
Scope Change that
Caused Rework
Information Flow
Across Group
Boundary
Vendor Polygon
Symbol
Starburst Shape for
Noteworthy Items
There are several other interesting representational aspects. Noteworthy facts or events
are marked with starburst shapes that contain text to explain their content.
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Information that flows across the bands is indicated with a blue arrow instead of the black
reserved for intra-band information flow. Additionally, a special polygon is used to
indicate when interaction with a vendor is required. This shape is similar to the shape
used in Learning to See value stream maps (Rother and Shook, 1999). Furthermore,
some sets of closely-related tasks were performed with a back-and-forth flow of
information. Such sets of tasks are indicated with a circle having two white arrowheads
connecting the boxes. Examples of these formatting items are shown above in Figure
5.5.
Because the map is complicated and the flow of value is not as readily apparent as it was
for Project S, a second view of the map is shown below in Figure 5.6. It is identical to
the above figure, but is laid over with arrows that indicate the major flow of information
(and thus value).
Figure 5.6 Project R VSM with Value Flow Indicated
Project R lue -8
Stream Map with .t- 4
Value Flow
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- . ."- . . -. -J
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Value starts flowing at the left, as project planning is executed and general antenna
performance specs are loosely assigned. Then, the A/RF electronics group develops an
initial set of antenna requirements and also creates and analyzes the antenna architecture.
Once the architecture is established, each of the four major developmental groups
(controller, A/RF electronics, mechanical engineering, and power) can proceed with their
respective design tasks. The development effort divided along hardware subassembly
lines managed by integrated product teams (IPTs) with representation from the major
disciplines involved. Responsibility for the IPTs was assigned to the discipline leader
who had the most design activity related to the subassembly. The IPTs met weekly to
ensure that each designer was working to the latest information. While there is a
considerable amount of cross-group communication (especially between the mechanical
engineering group and the others) for the more complex hardware items, the predominant
flow of information for the simpler assemblies during preliminary and detail design stays
within each respective group. Around the time of CDR, each group sends out its design
for review by technical subject matter experts and management and then material and
component procurement begins. Once parts have been obtained, they are inspected and
unit-tested. The antenna parts are then assembled, integrated, and tested (indicated by the
last, upward-pointing arrow).
This map is rather large and complex. To make this value stream map easier to
understand for the reader, and to enable a value analysis of its tasks, a two-pronged attack
has been chosen. First, a higher-level abstraction of this map was made, which removes
size and complexity from the map. This map essentially offers a lower-resolution view
of the process. Contrarily, a set of higher resolution maps have been made. These maps
illustrate the development tasks associated with the development of three major
subassemblies of Antenna N: the controller, the radiator, and the structure. By focusing
on such smaller development effort, more detail can be shown. For the high-level map
and each of the subassembly maps, a value analysis of the tasks has been performed, and
EVMS data is presented. Also, the EVMS data for each subassembly is compared to its
respective VSM. The high-level map and analysis is in Section 5.5, and those for each of
the subassemblies are in Section 5.7-5.9.
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5.4.3 Mapping Effort
Similar to the Project S PDVSM, the mapping of this project took several iterations.
First, I interviewed the team leader and the group leader to learn about the project and
how team communicates. I acquired several process-related documents and began to try
to understand the Project R process. I then met with the team leader and all the group
leaders for a PDVSM activity, in which I asked them all to mark the tasks performed by
their groups with Post-It Notes on a very large piece of paper (about 4'x20'). After
transcribing this task list, I was able to start making connections between the tasks and
get dates for when the tasks occurred. I made several maps, and met with the team leader
and group leaders to get feedback on the most recent map. After six iterations on paper, I
used the same software to create several electronic iterations.
Several issues arose during the process of refining the map. First, people forget, and data
gets lost. This simple fact led to a lot of guesswork on my part to make the map accurate.
A lot of Project R documents did not list the actual dates for the start and end of various
tasks. A number of tasks were given similar dates which spanned far longer than any of
the given tasks should have taken. During program execution, this provides some buffer
against constant plan updates as the program scope fluctuates, but it sacrifices some of
the resolution needed for value stream mapping. The main reason why people forgot
things was that my collaboration with the Project R team did not begin until several
months after CDR and well into the manufacturing phase for the SDP antenna. Thus, by
making the map as the project progressed would have very much improved its accuracy.
Also, when dealing with such a complex process, there are hundreds of process steps.
Trying to map this many steps and their interactions to a two-dimensional surface is a
difficult task. One must continually make decisions about where tasks should be placed
relative to the others and how to connect each set of tasks to indicate how the information
flowed in the project. Overall, this was a difficult, time-consuming task.
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5.5 Project R High-Level Data
5.5.1 Project R High-Level Value Stream Map
Shown below in Figure 5.7 is the Project R High-Level Value Stream Map. It was
created as an abstraction of the full Project R Value Stream Map, and each box on this
map represents one or more tasks from the full map. Unlike the full detailed map, this
one is not inherently time-scaled. The arrangement of the boxes indicates the
approximate relative time in which each abstracted task was performed, but the boxes are
not stretched out like they are in the full map (as they are in the detailed subsystem value
stream maps). Arrows indicating the flow of value are shown behind the boxes. These
arrows correspond to those in Figure 5.7 (although the controller arrow in a different
place), and help one to see how the high-level VSM relates to the full detailed VSM.
Design reviews are indicated by circles.
While each of the tasks on this map were required for project progress, some were more
important than others. The project inception, antenna requirements development, system
architecture development and subsystem requirements development set the stage for the
preliminary design of the various antenna subsystems. The detail design fleshed out
these designs to create a set of drawings that could be sent off to vendors for fabrication.
Once materials were procured the various parts were assembled, integrated, and tested.
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Figure 5.7 Project R High-Level Value Stream Map
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Figure 5.7(cont) Project R High-Level Value Stream Map
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5.5.2 Project R High-Level Value Analysis
Table 5.1 Project R High-Level Value Analysis
Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Project Inception Process Establishes Establishes budget
scheduleI
Draft Subsystem Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Establishes quality
Performance Specs Product Amount of time and budget red's demanded
Released
Antenna Req'ts Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Determines what
Development Product Amount of time and budget red's product will be like
Initial System Product Determines the effort req'd => Amount Establishes product
Architecture of time and budget red's concept
Development &
Analysis
Develop Req'ts for Product Establishes what
Subsystems product will but
Initial "Circuit" Product Creates & tests quality
Design, Fab, & of product component;
Test reduces risk of failure
Prelim Antenna Product Creates & tests overall
Design & Analysis product concept
Advanced Design Process & Check status Checks quality
Review Product
2 nd "Circuit" Product Improves design
Design & Analysis quality; Tests new
design quality
Antenna Prelim Product Creates overall product
Design plan
Prelim Structure Product Creates & tests quality
Design & Analysis of product components
Prelim Power Product Creates & tests quality
Design & Analysis of product components
Prelim Controller Product Creates & tests quality
HW Design & of product components
Analysis
Prelim Controller Product Creates & tests quality
SW Design & of product components
Analysis
Preliminary Design Process & Checks schedule Checks cost Checks quality
Review Product performance performance
Antenna Detail Product Refines product
Design
Plan B Antenna Process & Risk mitigation to reduce likelihood of Risk mitigation strategy
Architecture Product costly & lengthy rework increases chances of
quality product
Plan B Antenna Process & Risk mitigation to reduce likelihood of Risk mitigation strategy
Detail Design Product costly & lengthy rework increases chances of
quality product
Make & Test Product Creates & tests crucial
Radiator Assembly product component
Prototype , _ , concept; Test its quality
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Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Radiator Detail Product Creates product
Design & Analysis component; Test its
quality
Update Antenna Product Refines overall product
Design plan
Chassis Detail Product Creates product
Design component
Structure Detail Product Creates product
Design component
Plan B Process & Risk mitigation to reduce likelihood of Risk mitigation strategy
Structure/Chassis Product costly & lengthy rework increases chances of
Design quality product
Power Detail Product Creates product
Design component
Plan B Power Process & Risk mitigation to reduce likelihood of Risk mitigation strategy
Detail Design Product costly & lengthy rework increases chances of
quality product
Controller HW Product Creates product
Detail Design component
Controller SW Product Creates product
Detail Design component
Code & Unit Test Product Creates product
component & tests its
quality
Drawing Review Product Checks quality of
Cycle product
Critical Design Process Checks status Gets customer
Review feedback; Checks
quality, status, &
direction
Release Various Process Enables fabrication
Drawings for & assembly
Fabrication
Radome Design w/ Process & Decreases length of Ensures vendor design
Vendor Product communication process & product of
cycle with vendor good quality
Obtain Quotes Process Determines time & budget for
procurement
Procure Materials Process Enables fabrication
& Components & assembly
Controller HW & Product Creates product & tests
SW Integration & its quality
Testing
Power System Product Creates product & tests
Integration & its quality
Testing
Assemble & Product Creates product & tests
Integrate its quality
Components
Test Radiator Product Creates product & tests
Assembly its quality
System Integration Product Creates final product
System Testing Product I-- Checks product quality
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5.5.3 Project R Overall EVMS Data
In addition to creating value stream maps, I was able to obtain a considerable amount of
EVMS data regarding this project. This information is the closest thing that Company X
has to a measurement of the value of tasks. This value is measured against a given
baseline scope and budget. These data were extracted from spreadsheets used by the
System D program office to monitor the project's status. While there was an immense
amount of data, the categories of focus are the monthly and cumulative BCWS, BCWP,
ACWP, CPI, SPI, and the monthly earned value claimed. Earned value (EV) was
claimed relative to the work breakdown structure, which divided the project into work
packages. Each of these work packages consisted of several tasks, which were broken
down into milestones and further into "inchstones". Each of the milestones and
"inchstones" for each work package were weighted for their relative value. As each
"inchstone" or milestone was reached, the weighted earned value for that task was added
to the respective work package's earned value reported. This earned value, as well as the
cost and schedule information, were reported each month. Overall numbers for Project R
are presented here, and specific information will be presented with each of the
subassemblies in Sections 5.7 -5.9. Due to difficulties in obtaining the proper data, no
overall Project R earned value numbers are presented. Table 5.2 below reiterates the
meanings of all the various EVMS acronyms.
Although the EVMS system has its advantages, the urge to use it to provide the complete
development story for any project must be resisted. It is only one tool in the program
management toolbox. Equally important are the critical chain schedule, manpower
forecasting sheets, engineering design notebooks, and team meetings. This last is
probably the best indicator of the health of the program, since it provides insight into
existing issues and indicators of what lies ahead, things that EVMS cannot do. There is
no substitute for direct communication with the design engineers themselves. Another
limitation of EVMS is that it assumes that the plan is constructed with perfect accuracy or
is at least agile enough to reflect program changes instantaneously. Variances are
attributed solely to performance. However, when task scope changes, any measure
against the original plan and conclusions drawn from that measure are of questionable
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value. In a development program, especially early on, the concepts/approaches/trades
change almost continuously, and it is difficult to keep the plans updated. This tends to
skew the performance indices. In this particular case, changes in requirements and system
architecture were made at a higher level in the program. These were not anticipated either
in the bid or in the subsequent planning. EVMS therefore loses some of its accuracy.
Table 5.2 EVMS Refresher
Acronym Full Name My Layman's Terms Formula
EVMS anagement System "a way to keep track of project progress" N/A
Work Breakdown "a division of the project into smallerWBS Structure tasks that can be completed by the teams N/A
assigned to them"
BCWS Budgeted Cost of "what should get done in the time N/AWork Scheduled scheduled"
BCWP Budgeted Cost of "what actually got done" N/AWork Performed
ACWP Actual Cost of Work "what it cost to actually perform the N/APerformed work"
SV Schedule Variance "how much was completed relative to SV = BCWP - BCWS
what was expected"___________
CV Cost Variance "how much it cost to do what was V = BCWP - ACWP
_________________________complete relative to what was expected" C CP-AW
SPI Schedule "normalized measure of how far away SPI = BCWP/BCWSPerformance Index from the schedule the task is"
CPI Cost Performance "normalized measure of how far away CPI = BCWP/ACWPIndex from the budget the task is"
Figure 5.8 shows the monthly cost and schedule information for Project R, and Figure 5.9
shows the cost and schedule performance indices (CPI and SPI). Together, these graphs
suggest how the project progressed. Months 1-7 were the preliminary design phase,
leading up to the PDR. In Months 1-4, the team was underproductive but was spending
less money than expected, resulting in the low CPI and high SPI. In Months 5-7, the
team caught up to schedule by spending a lot of money, which brought the cumulative
CPI and SPI back near 1.0. Month 8 marked the beginning of the detail design phase,
and the team performed to plan this month. In Month 9, the team was underproductive
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and ran over budget, but was able to bring the cumulative indices back near 1 by
increasing productivity in Months 10 and 11 and reducing costs during Month 11. After
Month 11, the project performance indices fell as each month the team was
underproductive and overspending.
Figure 5.8:
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If one assumes a static, representative plan, then based on the cumulative performance
indices, the team did not achieve all that it had planned during the detail design phase
(and spent too much doing it!). However, the data above does not provide insight into the
reasons why the variances occurred. Additionally, the Month 11-15 data has to be
observed carefully, as this is the period in which the re-baselining occurred. As will be
shown in the subassembly EVMS sections, the data from this time period is rather
dubious. Month 16 marked the beginning of the assembly, integration, and test phase of
Project R. Some of the subassemblies also continued performing more detail design
activities during this time period. The team was nearly perfectly productive this month,
and while they were highly productive in Months 17 and 20, they were over budget for
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Months 17-21. They ended this period on schedule and over budget. Here again, the
limitations of EVMS are evident since nothing in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 indicates that
approval was granted by the program office to perform to a 12% larger budget. The
baseline was not updated to reflect this decision; rather, the additional funds required
were earmarked for another development area without being transferred.
When all was said and done, it was not the budget performance shown here that caused
the restructuring near the end of Project R. It was the better-than-expected results from
the interferer measurements and high projected recurring cost that drove the customer to
reallocate the remaining approved funds to other areas within Project R.
Figure 5.9 Project R Overall Cost & Schedule Performance Indices
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5.6 Project R Subsystem Development
Three major Antenna N subsystems were selected for deeper analysis. In the following
sections, a value stream map, a value analysis, and EVMS data are presented for the
Antenna N controller, radiator, and structure. The controller is broken down further into
hardware and software development efforts.
The detailed subassembly VSMs use the same style and format as the detailed overall
Project R value stream map shown in Figure 5.4. Since these maps are essentially
sections of the horizontal bands from that figure, they are wide and short, which is not
conducive to the 8 V2" x 11" paper used to print this thesis. Thus, the maps are broken up
into left- and right-hand sections that are then stacked so as to fit on one sheet of paper in
landscape orientation. Large arrows indicate where the left half ends and where the the
right half begins, and how one flows into the other. The value analyses use the same
Oehmen framework to describe the value of each task in terms of how it contributes to
the product's or process's schedule, cost, and/or quality.
For the radiator and structure, the EVMS data presented is straightforward. However, the
controller development EVMS data is broken further into the electrical development of
two hardware components, the mechanical engineering effort, and the development of the
software. Thus, there are a total of six sets of EVMS data presented throughout Sections
5.7-5.9. Each set of data was broken into work packages for preliminary design and
detail design. These design phases ended with the PDR and CDR, respectively, and
according to plan, each of these work packages had to have full value claimed by the
review date.
For each of these data sets, three EVMS graphs present data for both preliminary and
detail design. One shows the EV claimed monthly for the tasks, one graph presents
monthly and cumulative BCWS, BCWP, & ACWP, and one shows the SPI and CPI data.
Some additional information is presented for the controller development.
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The EVMS data were collected from monthly spreadsheet reports that also included the
data for hundreds of other work packages. Through a massive effort, the data was
reorganized by work package, and reduced to only relevant information for each of the
work packages. The earned value claimed for each of these work packages was based
upon the aforementioned milestones and "inchstones". Thus, the EV for any given work
package can be interpreted as which (and how many) of the milestones that have been
completed.
There are a couple of points about this EVMS data to note before studying these graphs.
Due to the re-baselining effort, the data for months 11-15 are suspect. First, the available
data for Month 11 did not include any data related to the SDP (only had data regarding
the design of the production model, which is based on entirely different work packages).
For most data sets, the Month I1 BCWS, BCWP, and ACWP were extrapolated based
upon the monthly and cumulative Month 12 data. Thus, Month 11 is indicated as "11*"
on all the graphs to remind the reader of the dubious nature of this information.
Additionally, while the re-baselining effort was progressing, the EVMS accounting was
questionable, since BCWS and BCWP are set (after the fact) equal to the ACWP for each
month that the baseline was in flux. Thus, the CPI and SPI for each of these months were
steady at 1.0. Also, the earned value for each of these months was always reported as
1.0. Thus, the data for these months does is of limited use. The team leader's superiors
complained that the project was "running blind" during this time period, attesting to the
poor formal reporting on this part of the project. To alleviate this, team leaders manually
constructed the true EVMS data and reported progress each month during the re-
baselining period.
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5.7 Controller Development
As previously mentioned, the controller is an essential element that "steers" the antenna
to focus upon a signal. It consists of several pieces hardware subassemblies and the
software to control them. Excluding the initial requirements development, most of the
software development was independent from the hardware development, and the earned
value for this process was reported separately. The hardware consisted of several major
pieces, all of which required electrical engineering by the controller hardware group, as
well as drawings and analyses by the mechanical engineering group before final release.
Developing these two major components was a large enough effort was a large enough
effort that each had its own work package and had its earned value reported explicitly.
The earned value data for the work performed by the mechanical engineering group was
reported separately as well.
5.7.1 Controller VSM
Shown below in Figure 5.10 is the value stream map for the controller development
effort. Once the antenna architecture was developed and the draft performance
specifications released, the controller development began. First, the overall controller
requirements were developed, which then were updated after the ADR and used to create
the preliminary design of both the hardware and software. Before the PDR, a peer review
was held to prepare all controller preliminary design information. After the PDR, the
requirements update and detail design of the various hardware components were
completed independently from the software effort, which included a prototyping and
configuration management cycle. Prior to the CDR, there was another group peer review,
followed by an internal Company X review of all the Antenna N detail design. Before
the CDR, the hardware design was released for fabrication, and the software was coded
and each software unit was tested. After the hardware items were received from the
vendors and tested, they were assembled and combined with the integrated software
system. The controller was then tested before it was integrated with Antenna N for full
antenna testing.
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Figure 5.10 Project R Controller Value Stream Map
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5.7.2 Controller Value Analysis
Table 5.3 Controller Value Analysis
Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Develop Antenna Product Determines work effort needed Dictates antenna
Architecture performance & general
structure characteristics
Draft Subsystem Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Establishes quality
Performance Specs Product Amount of time and budget red's demanded
Released
Prelim Req'ts Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Determines what
Development Product Amount of time and budget red's product will be like
Review SW Req'ts Process & Prevents excessive effort using incorrect Makes sure req'ts are
Doc Product req'ts good; Ensures right
product/ process plan
Advanced Design Process & Check Status Checks quality
Review Product
SW Req'ts Doc Process Attempts to stabilize
Pseudo-Release req'ts and therefore
make all work value-
added
Prelim Design Product Begins creating product
component
Update Req'ts Product Refines what product
will be
HW Req'ts doc Process Stabilizes req'ts
Released
Organize Review Product Creates board for reviewing changes;
Board Allows config mgmt which prevents too
many costly and lengthy changes
PDR prep Process Makes PDR smoother
Preliminary Design Process & Checks status Checks quality
Review Product
Prototype & Code Process & Makes easier to Ensures req'ts
SW Product code SW later feasibility; Begins
creating the SW
Refine HW Specs Product Further defines what
product will be
HW Detail Design Product Creates quality
component
Develop Test Process Enables testing that will
Fixtures ensure product quality
SW Req'ts Put into Process Allows configuration management which
CM System prevents too many costly and lengthy
changes
SW Detail Design Product Creates quality product
component
Review SW Detail Product Prevents excessive effort using incorrect Make sure req'ts are
Design Docs req'ts good; Ensures right
product/ process plan;
Check quality
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Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
SW Req'ts Doc Process & Stabilizes req'ts
Release Product
Code & Unit Test Product Creates product
component & tests its
quality
Informal SDD Product Stabilizes design; Gets
Release feedback to improve
quality
Peer Review Process Checks quality;
Prepares for CDR
Internal Review Process Checks quality;
Prepares for CDR
Critical Design Process Checks status Gets customer
Review feedback; Checks
quality, status, &
direction
Formal SDD Product Stabilizes design
Release
Release HW Design Process Allows HW
for Fab fabrication to begin
Procure Vendor Process Obtains HW
HW
Receive Untested Process Allows HW
HW assembly,
integration, &
testing to begin
Write SW for Process Enables quality testing
Calibration of SW
Debug HW (Unit Product Improves product
Tests) quality
SW Integration Product Unifies product
Controller Product Unifies product;
Integration & Checks quality
Testing
Antenna Assembly Product Unifies product;
Integration & Checks quality
Testing
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5.7.3 Controller EVMS Data
5.7.3.1 Hardware Item #1
Figure 5.11 shows the EV reported by month for Controller Hardware Item #1 (HW 1).
While the data for Months 11-15 is of limited value, it is clear that no EV was claimed
until Month 3 and that a considerable amount was claimed during Months 6 and 10.
Figure 5.11 Controller Hardware Item #1 Earned Value
Preliminary Design
1 2
Detail Design
3 4 5 6 7 Months 8 9 10 11* 12 13 14 15
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 combine to tell an interesting story about HW1. First, through
Month 5, the group was far behind the work package schedule, as the BCWP fell behind
the BCWS. The monthly SPI bars on Figure 5.13 indicate Months 6 and 7 were very
productive. Months 5-7 were very expensive as the team caught up, but ran the work
package far over budget. No actual cost was claimed until Month 4, resulting in the
misleading spike in the preliminary design's cumulative CPI that month. Month 10 was
more productive and less expensive than expected, as is evident from the monthly SPI
and CPI.
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Figure 5.12 Controller Hardware Item #1 Cost and Schedule Data
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This data is consistent with the fact that the scope of the baseline plan for this effort
included updates to existing drawings only, no design work. The original performance
requirements for Antenna N were consistent with a design used on another program, but
when the additional capabilities were added by the System D systems engineering group,
it became necessary to do an entirely new design from scratch. No additional budget was
allocated to cover this effort. When the added scope is taken into account, the Controller
hardware design team actually achieved productivities slightly better than the typical
values achieved for this type of design.
For the preliminary design, the work package was 27% over budget, but met its schedule.
One cannot be certain about the relative performance of the detail design from this design
since it was "running blind". However, the fact that more than 40% of the final budget
was spent after Month 12, when the EV claimed first reached 1.0 (and thus that the work
package should have been finished) suggests that the work package ended up far over its
original budget. The final budget after Month 15 was 156% of the budget planned as of
Month 10.
5.7.3.2 Hardware Item #2
The graphs below for Controller Hardware Item #2 (HW2) tell a story very similar to that
of HW1. The preliminary design was behind schedule, until the very productive Months
6 and 7, in which the team caught up to schedule. The one glaring difference is that the
ACWP for HW2 did not over shoot the BCWS during this catch up period. In fact, the
work package ended up being about 30% under budget, as opposed to the 27% over
budget for the similar HW1 preliminary design work package. The spike in detail design
cumulative SPI is deceptive, and is an artifact because there was no BCWS reported for
Months 9 and 10. A similar 40+% of the final budget was spent after Month 12, when
the EV claimed first reached 1.0 (again, which would mean that the work package should
be completed), so one might assume that the HW2 detail design was also over budget.
Also similar to HWl, the final Month 15 budget was considerably higher than the Month
10 budget; the former was 212% of the latter!
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Here again, the explanation lies in the fact that scope increases always result in
unfavorable comparisons against the baseline. In this case, more stringent antenna
requirements and a request by the customer for demonstrations of additional Antenna N
features forced the design of a second version of HW2.When this unbudgeted scope is
accounted for, the productivities of the Controller hardware team reach levels consistent
with that achieved on other large programs.
Figure 5.14 Controller Hardware Item #2 Earned Value
Preliminary Design Detail Design
B - Ml I 0RFM
3 4 5 6 7 Months 8 9 10 11* 12 13 14 15
111
0.8
0.6
U
0.4
0.2
0
1 2
Figure 5.15 Controller Hardware Item #2 Cost and Schedule Data
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5.7.3.3 Mechanical Engineering Effort
The data from the controller mechanical engineering effort (MEE) in Figures 5.17-5.19
tells a simple story. Like HW1 and HW2, this work package started off behind schedule
and the engineers had to accomplish much in the later months of preliminary design.
During Months 5-7, the team was able to catch up rather cheaply, and the preliminary
design effort ended up more than 50% under budget! For the detail design, the story is
rather murky. In the first month, the group accomplished more than was expected far
more cheaply than expected, but the next two months, money was spent and very little
earned value claimed. The extrapolated numbers from Month 11 indicate that the group
was highly productive before the re-baselining period. 38% of the detail design final
Month 15 budget (which was 119% of the Month 10 budget) was spent after Month 12,
when the earned value claimed first reached 1.0. Again, this indicates that this work
package ended over budget.
Figure 5.17 Controller Mechanical Engineering Effort Earned Value
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Figure 5.18 Controller Mechanical Engineering Effort Cost and Schedule Data
Preliminary Design Detail Design
0% 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Months 8 9 10 11* 12 13 14 15
i Monthly BCWS Monthly BCWP Monthly ACWP -+- Cum BCWS - Cum BCWP -0- Cum ACWP
Figure 5.19 Controller Mechanical Engineering Effort Performance Indices
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5.7.3.4 Software Development
The EVMS data for the controller software in Figures 5.20-5.22 indicates that the
software (SW) preliminary design proceeded much like those of the rest of the controller
work packages in that it started off behind schedule, and had to catch up in Months 5 and
6. Like HW2 and MEE, it ended under budget. It is interesting to note that the Month 3
BCWP was greater than 20% but no ACWP was claimed; however in Month 4, no
BCWP was claimed, but the ACWP was about 20%. The detail design phase was behind
schedule for Months 8-10, but the extrapolated Month 11 data indicates that they were
very productive this month, and caught up to schedule. Just like the other work packages,
Months 12-15 drove up the final budget (to 137% of the Month 10), as about 40% of the
final budget was spent after Month 12, when the EV first reached 1.0.
Unlike the other controller work packages, the SW development continued after the re-
baselining was complete, and continued with a new work package in Months 16-21. The
schedule for this second detail design phase expected the group to achieve 68% of the
schedule in the first month. While the group was behind after this month, they were able
to catch up and be on budget by Month 18. However, in finishing the last 8% of the
earned value, the group spent 83% of the final budget, resulting in the work package
being 71% over budget.
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Figure 5.20 Controller Software Earned Value
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Figure 5.22 Controller Software Performance Indices
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In addition to the preliminary and detail design work packages that all other parts of the
controller development had, the SW development also had several additional work
packages that dealt with quality assurance, configuration management, and two specific
sets of modifications to the software. The earned value for these work packages is shown
below in Figure 5.23 along with that of the preliminary and detail design work packages.
This information offers a deeper look at the software development process. As is evident
from the graph, the software Modification Set #1 and Quality Assurance tasks did not
take very long once they were begun, but the Configuration Management task took five
months of steady progress to complete. Modification Set #2 took the longest, and had a
strange three-month time span in which no EV was claimed.
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5.7.4 Controller EVMS & PDVSM Comparison
By creating both the PDVSM and associated value analysis, I have presented an
outsider's opinion of the value of each of the tasks in Project R. From studying the
EVMS data, one learns how Company X values the various phases of the development.
Comparing the two sets of data illustrates how well the PDVSM corresponds to the actual
process and how well the Earned Value Management System tracks the addition of value
in the process. The EVMS data presented in the previous sections have been condensed,
and just the earned value for each step is superimposed over the PDVSM for the process.
The controller is by far the most complex of the subassemblies studied, and thus this
comparison is rather long and difficult. As was presented, the controller consisted of the
major work packages associated with the preliminary and detail design of HW1, HW2,
SW, and MEE. Figure 5.24 presents the PDVSM and EVMS comparison for the overall
controller development, showing the EV for each of these four sets of work packages.
Since the PDVSM does not specifically identify any task as either HW1 or HW2
development, and since the EV for these two developments is very similar for each
month, the analysis will focus on "controller hardware" as a general term to encompass
both. Additionally, it is known that the mechanical engineering group performed analysis
tasks and created the detailed drawings needed for the hardware development, but there
are no tasks on the value stream map that specifically call out this group. Thus, the
comparison for this mechanical data is loose guesswork at best, and is included with the
hardware development. While the software development is shown in this figure to
illustrate its relation to the hardware development and mechanical effort, it is not
analyzed in the same section as the hardware development. The SW preliminary and
detail design are analyzed with the other SW work packages, presented together in Figure
5.25. For both the hardware and software comparison below, the EV for each month is
analyzed in relation to the value of tasks worked upon that month (according to the
PDVSM).
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Figure 5.24 Project R Controller Work Packages EVMS and PDVSM Comparison
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5.7.4.1 Controller Hardware Development Comparison
The story of the preliminary design for each of the hardware and mechanical work
packages presented before is well illustrated in Figure 5.24. In Months 3 and 4, the
requirements were being developed. Each of the HW work packages totaled about 25%
EV for these two months, but there was no MEE EV claimed. Since creating the
requirements frames the rest of the development and determines what the controller will
be like, this 25% number for each HW development makes sense. It also makes sense
that there is no mechanical EV in Month 3, but the 14% claimed in Month 4 is
incongruent with the VSM. In Month 5, the preliminary design, requirements update,
and test planning tasks began. There was very little EV claimed for the HW work
packages, but there was a considerable amount (34%) for the MEE. The former seems to
make sense, as during the beginning of the preliminary design, there is a great deal of
uncertainty about the design, and thus it is hard to claim any EV. The mechanical EV
claimed does not make much sense relative to the VSM since there are no tasks on the
map that seem to indicate the work of this group. This could represent a shortcoming of
the PDVSM. In Months 6 and 7, a great deal of EV was claimed, as the controller
hardware development caught up to schedule. The HW tasks claimed an averaged of
48% EV in Month 6 and 20% in Month 7. This was when the tasks begun in Month 5
were finished, the HW requirements document was released, and PDR was held. During
these months, the MEE claimed 40% and 12% earned value, respectively. The EV
claimed in these months indicates that a lot of the milestones and "inchstones" were
reached during Month 6 and that the preliminary design wrapped up in Month 7 as it
should be according to the PDVSM. The tasks completed in these months helped to
reduce the uncertainty in the product and improve its quality by creating the design and
stabilizing the requirements; it makes sense that so much EV was claimed.
The detail design paints a cloudy picture of the value. Each of the HW tasks claimed
about 20% EV total for Months 8 and 9; the mechanical group totaled 26% (almost all in
Month 8). According to the PDVSM, the tasks begun during this period included the
actual detail design, requirements updating, and test fixture development. While these
are important tasks that contribute greatly to defining the product, they are not complete
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at this point. Thus it is no surprise that little EV was claimed, as was the case in the
beginning of the preliminary design. In Month 10, the HW tasks produced a great deal,
claiming an average 30% of the work packages' value, but there was no EV for the MEE
work package. The tasks in this month were the same as in the previous ones, and one
can only assume that at this point, the design and requirements had matured such that
more milestones could be achieved. Under this assumption, the EVMS and PDVSM
correspond for the HW tasks; in the case of the MEE, it corresponds for this month
independent of the assumption. The EVMS data for Months 11-15 offer very little
insight, as the re-baselining effort clouded when the value was actually added (it appears
Month 12 was productive while Months 11, 13, 14, and 15 were a vacation for the
engineers). It can be clearly seen, however, that during this time period much EV was
claimed for each group as they finished the tasks begun in Months 8 and 9. The
remaining value of these tasks was finally claimed, as the HW groups claimed an average
of 50% work package EV in this period; the mechanical group, 76%! This amount of
earned value is congruent with the value analysis base on the PDVSM.
Overall the controller hardware development EVMS data is congruent with the PDVSM
developed, with a few exceptions. The PDVSM does not have any indication of how the
MEE relates to the rest of the work packages. The EVMS data's lack of resolution in
Months 11-15 that obfuscates the comparison. During the beginning of both design
phases, the work packages were behind schedule, and very little EV was claimed. This
fact seems to suggest that either the expectations of the group (BCWS) were excessive,
the group underperformed (BCWS-wise), or (most likely) that the milestones do not
adequately address the beginning of each design phase (they are mostly end-loaded).
5.7.4.2 Controller Software Development Comparison
The controller software development preliminary was similar to that of the hardware
development: more than 20% EV was claimed in Month 3, much less in Month 4, a
ramp-up in Months 5 and 6 to catch up to the schedule, and much less in Month 7. The
Month 3 EV makes sense for the same reason that the hardware development did: the
initial requirements development is crucial for shaping the final product, but does not
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remove a considerable amount of uncertainty. The lack of Month 4 EV correlates well
with the controller PDVSM, in which the only task for that time was the execution of the
ADR. According to the controller software group leader, when reviewing the software
requirements document, it became apparent that the software requirements were heavily
dependent upon the hardware architecture, and that the document produced in Month 3
could not be considered to have much value until the hardware architecture was settled.
Thus, perhaps Month 4 was spent waiting for the hardware architecture to be established
while creating a draft version of the requirements document. During Month 5, this
unstable requirements document was released while requirements were being updated,
and preliminary design began. In order for the software requirements to be officially
released, it needed to be entered in to the configuration management system, which
begins with a review board of various high-level engineers and managers. A board
should have been in place before, but it was during this time that the group leader had to
scramble to assemble such a review board. The group claimed 27% earned value this
month (much more than either hardware group but less than the mechanical group),
which seems about right for the number of valuable tasks performed. Like all the other
controller work packages, Month 6 was when the most software EV was claimed as the
group caught up to schedule. In Month 7, the EV tailed off (from 46% to 4%) as the
remaining preliminary design and requirements updates were finished in preparation for
the PDR.
The software detail design started off behind schedule, and the group did not achieve
much until the confusing re-baselining period. In Month 8, as the software was being
prototyped and the detail design begun, 12% EV was claimed. During Month 9, no EV
was claimed, and this could be a result of having to perform rework due to requirements
creep and uncertainty. In Month 10, the group claimed 6% EV as the requirements were
finally entered into the configuration management system, the detail design was being
performed, and its results were being reviewed. This small amount of earned value
seems to be another case of the lack of early design milestones. In Months 11-15, a
whopping 82% of the earned value for the software detail design was claimed. During
this period, the detail design was performed and reviewed, the requirements made it into
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the configuration management system and were officially released, an informal design
document release was made, and the CDR preparatory meetings were held. Each of these
tasks adds considerable value to the design process, and it makes sense that such a
considerable portion of the EV was earned in this period. If this period had better EV
resolution, it would have enabled better comparison with the PDVSM since the software
portion had good resolution.
The software development was not finished by the end of the re-baselining effort, and a
second detail design work package was created. Most of the EV this work package was
claimed in Months 16-18, and with some being claimed until Month 21. This fact makes
sense, as Months 16-19 were when the software code and unit test was being performed
and the Software Design Document (SDD) was formally released.
Also during this period after the re-baselining, four other smaller work packages related
to the software development were completed, as is shown in Figure 5.23. Configuration
management began in Month 16 and continued at a relatively steady pace through Month
21. There is no reflection of this work package on the PDVSM. In fact, the only
reference to configuration management was during the first detail design period;
obviously, these are not one and the same. A work package for quality assurance had
minimal earned value claimed on it in Months 16 and 17, but had an incredible amount
during Months 18 and 19 (with a minor amount in Month 20). While there is no PDVSM
task associated with this work package, its spike in earned value coincides with the
tailing off of the second software detail design work package and the last part of the
"code and unit test" task. This fact suggests that the later part of the "code and unit test"
task, testing was performed for quality assurance purposes. Also, there were two sets of
software modifications performed in this period. Software Modification Set A dealt with
the controller calibration effort. Strangely enough, this task reported about half of its EV
in Months 16 and 17 but then claimed no more EV until Months 21-23. This fact
suggests that something is amiss, as one would expect that the task would not stop and
then continue after a three-month hiatus. Also this gap in the EV disagrees with the
PDVSM, which has a task named "Write SW for Array Calibration" which occurred
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mostly during Months 18 and 19. Finally, Modification Set B was completed in Months
21-23, with the majority of the work being performed in Month 22. This work package is
not reflected in the PDVSM.
The software development effort was similar to the hardware development for the
preliminary and detail design phases, in that each phase started behind schedule and
ended with a spike in effort at the end. Also, the comparison was invalidated during the
re-baselining period. However, the software development was different in that it had a
second detail design phase and several other work packages. Of these, only the quality
assurance and the second software detail design packages are reflected in the PDVSM.
5.8 Radiator Development
The radiator is an integral part of the antenna design. Thousands of radiators cover the
antenna's surface and allow it to properly interact with electromagnetic radiation so that
it can perform its intended function. A considerable amount of electronics sits between
the radiators and the controller that "steers" the antenna by activating certain sets of
them. The design of the radiator is crucial to the performance of the antenna, and was
performed by the A/RF electronics group.
5.8.1 Radiator VSM
Shown below in Figure 5.26 is the value stream map for the radiator development effort.
It shows how the development of the antenna architecture and requirements preceded the
ADR, and that subsequently the requirements were updated and the preliminary design
schematics were developed. After the PDR, information was released to the vendor for
creating a radiator prototype based upon these preliminary schematics. During the
prototype build, the radiator design was more fully fleshed out and then analyzed. Once
the prototype was assembled and partially tested, it became obvious that there was a
specific problem with the radiator design; consequently, a new design was developed
before the CDR. After the CDR, this new design was released for vendor fabrication. As
the vendor sent back the first of the assemblies that contain the radiators, it was tested.
Once all radiator assemblies were tested, they were integrated to make Antenna N.
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Figure 5.26 Project R Radiator Value Stream Map
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5.8.2 Radiator Value Analysis
Table 5.4 Radiator Value Analysis
Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Draft Subsystem Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Establishes quality
Performance Specs Product Amount of time and budget red's demanded
Released
Antenna Req'ts Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Determines what
Development Product Amount of time and budget red's product will be like
Develop Antenna Process & Sets goals; Determines the effort req'd => Determines what
Architecture Product Amount of time and budget red's product will be like
Advanced Design Process & Check Status Checks quality of
Review Product product and process
Develop Prelim Product Begins creating product
Design Schematics
Update Reqt's Product Refine what product
will be
PDR Prep Process Makes PDR smoother
Prelim Design Process & Checks status Check quality of design
Review Product
Fab Release for Process Enables prototype
Radiator Prototype fabrication
First SDP Radiator Product Creates product
Design
Analyze Radiator Product Checks product quality
Design
Develop Test Plan Process Determines test cost and schedule Figures out how to
proceed;
Refine Specs Product Further defines what
product will be
Procure Prototype Process Enable testing to
Hardware begin
Prototype HW Process Enable testing to
Assembly begin
Radiator Prototype Product Learn if redesign necessary+ Whether Checks quality of
Testing or will be costly and require more time radiator assembly
architecturalconcept
Alternate Radiator Product Creates new product to
Design avoid problems of the
original design
Peer Review Process Check quality; Prepare
for CDR
Internal Review Process Check quality; Prepare
for CDR
Critical Design Process Checks status Gets customer
Review feedback; Checks
quality, status, &
direction
SDP Radiator Process & Enables fabrication Fully defines the
Design Released Product product
Procure Radiator Process Enables assembly
HW
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5.8.3 Radiator EVMS Data
Similar to the controller SW development, the radiator detail design was not complete
when the re-baselining took full effect after Month 15, and thus had a second detail
design work package. The radiator EVMS data in Figures 5.27-5.29 combine to paint a
bleak picture in which the budget was exceeded by all three of the design phases. The
radiator preliminary design was similar to that of HWl and other work packages in that
the team did not accomplish much at first, and had to be highly productive in the final
months to catch up. In Figure 5.28, one can see that Months 5-7 were very expensive,
and drove the work package to almost 50% over budget. The Month 3 CPI spike resulted
because little money was spent, but much EV was claimed. Also, the SPI spikes in
Months 6 and 7 are due to the team catching up after being behind. The first three
months of the detail design phase, the team achieved as much as planned, but spent too
much doing so. The data from Months 12-15 were similar to all the others, only
indicating that more than 50% of the final budget was spent after Month 12, when the EV
claimed was 1.0. The final budget for the detail design was more than twice as much as
the budget from Month 12, which itself was three times as much as the original Month 8
budget. Thus, this phase of the design was probably over budget. The second detail
design phase was front-loaded and also ran 40% over budget. About 80% of the EV was
claimed in the first month of this work package (at a reasonable cost), but the final 20%
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Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Receive First Process Enables unit testing
Radiator Assembly & eventual antenna
assembly,
integration & test
Test Radiator Product Checks product quality
Assembly
Receive Remaining Process Enables unit testing
Radiator & eventual antenna
Assemblies assembly,
integration & test
Antenna Assembly, Product Assembles final
Integration, & Test product; Check its
quality; Final proof of
quality
cost 55% of the final budget and sent the work package to 40% over the final budget. In
all, the radiator development was far over budget.
Figure 5.27 Radiator Earned Value
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Figure 5.28 Radiator Cost and Schedule Data
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5.8.4 Radiator EVMS & PDVSM Comparison
The radiator EVMS data is easily comparable to the PDVSM. During the preliminary
design, the team fell behind and had to catch up during Months 6 and 7 as the
requirements were updated, the preliminary schematics were completed, and the PDR
was held. The EV claimed during the first month of the preliminary design aligns with
the development of the antenna architecture and the initial antenna requirements
development. While these tasks were not exclusively related to the radiator, the radiator
is a considerable component of the antenna; thus, the 25% EV claimed makes sense. In
the detail design, the 25% claimed the first month coincides with several tasks: the
radiator prototype design release for fabrication, the first SDP radiator design, the test
plan development, and the refinement of the requirements. All these tasks have a strong
value component, so it make sense that so much EV should be claimed. Based on the
pattern of the controller, it is likely that little EV was claimed relative to the requirements
updating; much of the 25% from Month 8 is likely related to the radiator design and the
test plan development. In Months 9 and 10, the radiator design was analyzed, the
requirements update was continued, and the prototype was procured and assembled.
During this time, nearly 31% of the work package EV was claimed. This fact makes
sense, as the prototype build and analysis contribute to the reduction of uncertainty in the
product quality.
As was the case with the controller, the re-baselining period hides when EV was claimed
in the later portion of the detail design. Only 44% of the work package's EV was
claimed in this time period in which a relatively large number of tasks were completed:
the requirements were settled, the radiator prototype testing executed, the alternate
radiator design was begun, and the CDR preparations done. The PDVSM and value
analysis indicate that more value should have been added, and therefore disagree with the
EVMS data. Like the controller software, the radiator also had a second detail design
phase. A whopping 80% of the EV was claimed in Month 16, with Months 17 and 18
combining for the remainder. The incredible amount of EV claimed in Month 16 is
logical, as it was during this time period that the alternate radiator design was completed
and the CDR was held. The 15% EV claimed in Month 17 can be attributed to the
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release of the radiator design for fabrication and the procurement of the radiator (which
continued into Month 18). Overall, the radiator design EVMS matches the PDVSM, but
has some points of disagreement.
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Figure 5.30 Project R Radiator EVMS and PDVSM Comparison
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5.9 Structure Development
The structure is the physical housing for all the electronics, radiators, controller, and power
system for Antenna N. For Project R, the overall structure developed was the size of a full
antenna, but the SDP version of Antenna N only had 25% (then 20%, then 13%, then 6%) of its
surface covered with active radiators. A smaller structure had to be designed that could hold the
active radiators and associated electronics within the much larger overall structure. This smaller
structure, known as the chassis, caused several problems for the development effort. Reviewers
determined that the chassis design had to be changed before it could be released for fabrication.
Additionally, the structure itself had to be obtained from a vendor. Before it was ordered, the
overall structure had to be changed to fit either the Plan A or the Plan B design. Because the
structure is such a large item, its procurement had a long lead time, and in between its order and
receipt by Company X, requirements changed, but the structure could not be changed. This led
to a discrepancy between the chassis and structure, and thus the chassis design was adjusted.
5.9.1 Structure VSM
Figure 5.31 illustrates the value stream map for the Project R structure development. After the
antenna architecture was established, the requirements and architecture for the structure were
created. Between ADR and PDR, the requirements were updated and the architecture was turned
into a preliminary design. After PDR, several major changes created problems for the structure
development process. First, when the "deliverable" status was determined, it required that
drawings and documents be far more detailed than they were and that everything be very well
documented. At the PDR, it was determined that the chassis was needed for the structure to
properly interact with the rest of the SDP testing. This requirements change led simultaneous
execution of the chassis and structure design, requirements update, and analyses. Since using the
chassis required special connections and since it had not been part of the original design, a
prototype for the chassis was created between PDR and CDR. Additionally, the invocation of
Plan B led to design changes for the structure. Instead of creating a separate design just for Plan
B, the original design was changed to accept either the Plan A or Plan B system architecture.
Further along during the detail design, two major changes to the requirements of the System D
design caused a lot of rework in the Antenna N structural design. These two changes dictated
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that a key parameter in the structure's design must be changed and at the same time that the
structure would have to bear a great deal more of the load of the electronics than had been
previously planned. Not only did these changes cause a great deal of rework for the structure
and chassis design, but also limited the value of the previous chassis prototype (which had been
designed to the earlier requirements).
After the structure and chassis design were considered complete, they were released to a
management review cycle. The overall structure design was approved and entered into the
procurement process nearly immediately, which was beneficial since the large and complex
structure required a lengthy time period for vendor delivery. While the structure made it through
the review cycle, the reviewers demanded that changes be made to the chassis design. The
changes were made, and the design was approved for procurement release before the Peer
Review and Internal Review. During the Internal Review, several issues were discovered that
required the design information be updated before the customer CDR. About seven months after
the structure design was released, Company X received and inspected the structure assembly.
The structure was subsequently assembled with the other hardware items, and the full Antenna N
was integrated and tested. During this time, the mechanical engineering group spent several
months updating and re-releasing drawings so that they would perfectly match what was actually
delivered for Antenna N. This drawing update effort was required because of the "deliverable"
status decision.
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Figure 5.31 Project R Structure
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5.9.2 Structure Value Analysis
Table 5.5 Structure Value Analysis
Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process
Develop Antenna Product Determines work effort needed Dictates antenna
Architecture performance & general
structure characteristics
Initial Req'ts Product Dictates what structure
Development must do
Prelim Structure Product Dictates structure
Architectural format
Definition
Advanced Design Process & Checks status; Determines Structure & Checks status;
Review Product Chassis Needed Determines structure &
=>more effort chassis Needed
Update Req'ts Product Refine what structure
must do; Defines what
chassis must do
Prelim Design Product Creates Initial Design
PDR Prep Process Makes PDR smoother
Prelim Design Process & Checks schedule Checks cost Checks Quality
Review Product Performance Performance
Refine Specs Product Improves knowledge of
what structure &
chassis must do
SDP Antenna Product Defines the chassis
Chassis Design
SDP Antenna Product Defines the structure
Structure Design
Structural & Product Checks the quality of
Thermal Analysis the design
Structure/Chassis Product Checks feasibility of
Prototype Build the structure/ chassis
concept
Chassis Design Process Allows for quality
Release check
Structure Design Process Allows for quality
Release check
Drawing Review Product Checks quality of
Cycle design
Chassis Design Product Dictates how to
Changes Requested improve design quality
Chassis Design Product Improves design quality
Changes Made
Obtain Quotes Process Determines lead Determines cost for
time for materials materials
Peer Review Process Prepares for the internal
review
Internal Review Process Prepares for CDR
Incorporate Peer Process Improve design and
Review Changes presentation
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Task Product/ Time Cost Quality
Process I
Critical Design Process Checks status Gets customer
Review feedback; Checks
quality, status, &
direction
Updating & Re- Process Done because of
Releasing Detail "deliverable" status;
Drawings Did not have much
effect on the design;
Created better drawings
for production antenna
design to start from
Structure Material Process Determines when Determines
Procurement materials can be how much
assembled materials will
cost
Receive Structure Process Allows inspection &
Assembly assembly to begin
Structure Product Checks the quality of
Inspection the parts
Antenna Assembly, Product Creates Antenna N;
Integration, & Test Tests Performance of
Antenna N; Prepares
for Integration with
SDP I
5.9.3 Structure EVMS Data
Shown in Figures 5.32-5.34, the Structure EVMS data paints the structure development
in a light similar to all the other component developments. The development was behind
schedule for the first four months of preliminary design, but caught up in Months 5-7.
Due to modest expenditures and worthwhile productivity in Months 3 and 4, deceptively
high CPI values were reported. In Months 6 and 7, however, the ACWP was very high
and drove the work package over 14% budget. During the first three months of detail
design, the team was nearly on schedule, and was actually under budget. During the re-
baselining period, 36% of the overall budget was spent after the detail design EV was
claimed as 1.0, resulting in the final budget being 148% of the Month 10 detail design
budget. Thus, the detail design phase was similar to the preliminary design phase in that
they both went over budget.
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Figure 5.32 Structure Earned Value
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5.9.4 Structure EVMS & PDVSM Comparison
The structure EVMS data and PDVSM align well as is shown below in Figure as each of
the monthly EV claimed makes sense with respect to the value analysis. It stands to
reason that little EV was claimed in Month 3, as the structural architectural definition was
just beginning. The initial requirements development and architecture were complete by
the ADR in Month 4, justifying the 20% EV that month. 36% of the work package EV
was claimed in Month 5, at the beginning of the preliminary design and requirements
update. Months 6 and 7 averaged 19% EV claimed as the preliminary design was
wrapped up and PDR held.
The structure differs from the other subassemblies in that a great deal of EV was claimed
during Month 8. This suggests either the group was highly productive this month or the
EV milestones were better aligned with the tasks being performed than they were for the
other subassemblies. During this month, the requirements were updated, the chassis and
structure design were begun, and the structural and thermal analyses began. Also during
Month 8, changes to the interface between Antenna N and the rest of the SDP had to be
dealt with. The EV claimed this month seems to be excessive for the work seen on the
PDVSM. The EV from Months 9 and 10 totaled 23% as the tasks from Month 8 were
continued and better defined. The EV for each of these months makes more sense than
does that of Month 8. The structure is no different than the rest of the Antenna N
development in that it faced the obfuscation of the earned value data by the re-baselining
during Months 11-16. Looking at all the tasks completed during this period on the
PDVSM, the 52% EV claimed during this time is less than what the PDVSM and value
analysis suggest. The completion of all the tasks from Month 8, coupled with all the
other tasks, should add more value. Overall, the structure development followed a
different pattern than the other subassemblies in that it was more front-loaded, but
unfortunately suffered the same confusion due to the re-baselining.
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Figure 5.35 Project R Structure EVMS and PDVSM Comparison
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5.10 Project R Conclusions
Project R was a complex hardware prototype development effort, and the complex
system context that it operated within created issues that handicapped the effectiveness of
the project. The requirements uncertainty haunted the entire development effort, causing
each group on the team to keep working on requirements long after they should have
been settled. The uncertainty associated with the extended period of project re-baselining
(resulting from an increase in the product's scope) affected the engineer's efforts and
hampered the team's use of the Earned Value Management System. Also due to outside
influences, the project funding was reallocated before its product, the prototype antenna,
could be properly tested within the SDP context.
This complex process was represented by a large Product Development Value Stream
Map, which enables one to see the flow of information between tasks. In order to
qualitatively analyze how value was created in Project R, this large intricate map was
both abstracted into a simpler high-level map and also broken down into detailed
subassembly map sections. The tasks from each of these maps were analyzed with the
Oehmen value framework, and the EVMS data for each subassembly was collected and
studied. The EVMS data was then compared to the PDVSM for each of the subassembly
maps. These comparisons revealed some issues general to all of the subassemblies, and
some specific to each one. It was obvious that comparing the EVMS data to the PDVSM
is not only feasible but also valuable, for it helps improve understanding of the project
and offers a useful means for analyzing how value was added during the project.
However, this comparison does not tell the whole story, since the EVMS data is of
limited use when scope changes occur, and the PDVSM (in this case) is somewhat
uncertain due to its construction after the design effort, rather than concurrent with it.
All of the subassemblies tended to follow the same pattern within each of their respective
work package phases: they fell behind, and then caught up to schedule near the end of the
phase (often overspending to do so). This fact could be due to many factors, but it is
suggestive of external influences common to the project and design team as a whole. This
is supported by the global impacts of the higher level architecture changes, delayed
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requirements, excessive up-front expectations, and uncertainty over the "deliverable"
status of the antenna. Another consideration is that for discrete milestones, earned value
is often achieved and claimed in a back-loaded manner. That is, a lot of work is done up
front to support the design before any tangible milestones can be claimed, but this
groundwork allows the milestones to be claimed rapidly near the end of the task. By
contrast, the engineering team spends at a constant rate, so the ACWP data is essentially
linear over time. This results in a schedule variance at the beginning of a task, and a
correction at the end. Also, the re-baselining effort created confusion and clouded the
EVMS data for all of the subassemblies. As mentioned above, this turbidity of the
EVMS data severely limited the usefulness of the data, and considerably hindered
comparison with the PDVSM, over what was a particularly value-adding portion of the
project.
While most of the issues that affected Project R were out of the hands of the Project R
team, perhaps the team could work to identify better up-front milestones that reflect how
the early stages of a work package add value to the project. Also, increased pressure
should be put on the System D program office to move more quickly with the re-
baselining, as it was in the six months between its beginning and implementation that the
team was "running blind" and had to create the EVMS data manually in order to use it as
a management tool.
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6 Research Summary and Conclusions
The concepts of value and value stream are crucial to the philosophy of Lean, and a better
understanding how these concepts relate to product development is essential for the
creation of a Lean PD strategy. While others have looked at how different aspects of
Lean relate to PD in various ways, I focused on learning more about value by looking at
two case studies and two different value perspectives: Value Stream Management and
Earned Value Management. By looking at these projects at Company X with two
different value lenses and comparing them, a great deal was learned about each and about
how they relate to value and incorporating Lean into product development.
First and foremost, both projects showed that the two value perspectives are comparable.
The superposing of the EV data on top of each PDVSM proved to be a valuable
approach, as it enabled an easy visual comparison of the project with the official value
measurement. The comparison also made misalignments between the perspectives
visible, and illustrated that similar levels of resolution are necessary for EVMS data to be
adequately compared to PDVSMs.
Creating each PDVSM was a difficult task, requiring many iterations and feedback from
the teams involved. Determining what really constituted a task worthy of representation
and, similarly, what level of detail to map the value stream at was a constant issue on
both projects. Neither project lent itself well to strictly using the format proposed by
McManus (2004), and I employed several new symbols in my maps (including ones for
reciprocal information flow and requirements changes). Using Morgan's (2002)
suggestion of having a timeline on the maps ultimately made the comparison to the
EVMS data more feasible. His other suggestion of using different horizontal bands for
different functional groups (commonly referred to as "swim lanes") proved essential for
making the Project R PDVSM understandable. The special circular representation for the
requirements reuse analysis and development task in Project S was essential in properly
representing this process. The PDVSMs reflected how value was created in the projects,
helping me understand the processes and proving of interest to the team leaders. They
illustrated the flow of information in the projects and enabled the value analysis of each
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task using the Oehmen framework (Oehmen, 2005). By looking at the various value
analyses I made, it's evident that each project focused far more on product quality than
on time or cost. Also, the tasks focused more on creating product value than process
value. Whereas the high-resolution maps that Kato (2005) made enabled the
identification of value, the maps I made did not lend themselves to waste identification
very well.
The comparisons indicated that EVMS is not adequate for measuring value in the early
stages of development. Several other problems with EVMS were identified in this
research. In the case of Project S, using the number of "shalls" in the SRS book as a
measure of earned value led to a loose usage of EVMS and ultimately proved to be
inadequate, as it made it seem that the project was more fully complete that it really was.
Also, after it was realized that too much EV had been claimed, there was no way for the
Project S team to "unearn" value, who thus had to finish the project without using
EVMS. In Project R, limited work package resolution and the extended re-baselining
process (both beyond the control of the project team) limited the usefulness of the data
for understanding how Company X thought value was earned and for comparison with
the PDVSMs. Additionally, the milestones and "inchstones" used to claim value in the
early part of each Project R work package were not conducive to measuring the value that
was added, and new ones are needed. In both cases, the explicit link in EVMS between
budget and value motivated the behavior of the teams.
These two case studies are similar and yet diverse enough that their lessons seem to be
applicable to other product development processes. The projects are similar in that they
were both performed by employees of the same large company, at the same facility, and
for the same customer. Their products were both technologically demanding and closely
related to the core competency of Company X. Each project was on the same time scale,
lasting more than a year. Both used the EVMS system to monitor progress, and both had
issues related to the re-baselining of the budget and schedule. Both projects fell behind
schedule early and never really recovered. Outside influences from the complex project
contexts impacted each project, and ultimately neither was executed as planned. Both
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ended over budget and behind schedule. Requirements were crucial to each project, as
Project S was creating them, and Project R was significantly impacted by uncertainty and
changes to its requirements. Actually, the change to the reuse basis in Project S almost
could be considered a requirement change for the SRS process, and thus, these projects
were even more similar. At the very least, the lessons from these cases should be of
interest to Company X, but many of these issues are common to other projects within the
aerospace/defense industry.
The differences between the projects make them diverse enough (within the realm of
aerospace PD) to offer lessons that might be applicable to many other projects. One
project dealt with hardware, the other software. Project R was very complex and had
many groups involved; the other only was simpler and had but one small group of
engineers. Two different phases of the PD process were covered by these projects:
design and testing of a major prototype and requirements development. A spiral
development context surrounded one project, but Project S lay within a more standard PD
context. Project R had a very specific task breakdown; the other did not. These two
projects encompass both sides of many PD issues, and thus, their lessons may be more
widely applicable than expected.
The PDVSMs and value analyses presented in this paper are representations of my
perception of the projects, and the comparisons presented based upon them cannot be
taken as a golden standard. The framework proposed in the thesis is not a panacea for
best utilization of EVMS in deploying Lean, and the true value of the comparisons I
made between the PDVSMs and EVMS data was more conceptual than quantitative.
The overlaying of EVMS information on top of the PDVSMs allowed them to be easily
compared, but did not enable a comparison with the value analysis. Either by using a
different, more quantitative value analysis method or by being creative with the
information I had, I could have created a method for visually representing the value
contribution of each task on the map. If this were possible, it would have made the
overlapping comparison even more valuable. Moreover, the empirical testing and
validation will reveal the real value of use of this comparison framework.
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One of the key lessons from this research was the realization that EVMS does not really
measure the value of process tasks. It merely defines outputs from sets of tasks and the
costs associated with them, but not the value of them. It aspires to be a surrogate for
value. As explained above, EVMS suffers several problems that other process
measurements methodologies do. The metrics often mismatch the process and can
motivate undesired behavior. It is inflexible in dealing plans that must change. Also,
determining the proper level of resolution for recording and reporting the information is
important.
Perhaps there are ways to improve EVMS. A combined use of the EVMS and PDVSM
could hold great potential to both measure value and serve as a more nimble management
tool than standard EVMS. To make such a combined system, a project team could start
with a high-level WBS provided by the customer, and analyze the major tasks therein for
how they add value. This analysis could be done using the Oehmen framework (2005) or
some other value system. Once the top-level tasks have been analyzed, the budget could
be distributed among them more appropriately than they are in current practice (which is
based upon historical task cost performance).
After this allocation, the lower levels of the WBS could divide the work into smaller
tasks, and a PDVSM could be made to indicate the information flow between the tasks.
By analyzing the value of each task in this map, the project leaders could more
effectively assign task weightings (to improve EV fidelity to reality) and allocate budget
among the tasks. Also, a comparison could be made for each task to weigh its cost up
against the value it adds. If a task is determined to not be worth its budgeted cost,
another way to add the type of value it adds should be found, or the task should be
dropped outright. If neither of these options is possible, and a task is deemed
unavoidable, the task should become the focus of a kaizen event to improve its individual
performance. Such an event would need to be performed independently of the
implementation and usage of this hybrid system.
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By continually comparing the EVMS data and PDVSM, leaders should be better able to
track the progress of a project and make better decisions about how to make agile course
adjustments. Perhaps having a superimposed EVMS/PDVSM comparison that was
updated weekly or monthly would prove useful for visual analysis and for identifying
when action was needed. Such a system would enable leaders to see when there was a
stretch where little value of one type was added and then adjust accordingly. This hybrid
value management system also would let them ensure that all types of value needed on
the project were added.
This proposed combination system that encompasses EVMS and PDVSM is far from
reality. The vision as presented is similar to the research being done by Oppenheim
(2004) which uses PDVSMs to help project planning. Such a system could ultimately
help in the creation of the Lean PD display proposed by Graebsch (2005).
To make this system, we need to better understand value, its flow, and how to measure
the two. Getting to this state requires more research to be done. Other perspectives on
value need to be explored. Chase (2001) and Browning (2003) sought to understand
value by focusing on risk reduction. Graebsch (2005) presented how information
creation can be considered valuable. Exploring each of these perspectives on value
(along with others) would help create a better overall understanding of value.
Research should also be done into how to more accurately analyze value. While the
Oehmen (2005) framework has proven useful for this first analysis, perhaps subsequent
research will use another qualitative value framework, such as Chase's (2001). Also,
research should be done on how to turn such frameworks more quantitative. Perhaps this
could be as simple as relatively weighting the contributions of each task. The value
analysis could also be much more strictly quantitative such as what Browning (2003)
proposed or something akin to Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. Ultimately, exploring how
each of these methods expresses task value will help the application of Lean to PD.
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To help make this system, the PDVSM process and its representation techniques need to
be further refined. Specifically, figuring out how to represent the value of a task (from
any of the above analytical techniques) would prove very helpful for visual management.
If the PDVSM used in this hybrid system could illustrate the analyzed value of a task and
display it next to the EVMS value measurements, it would make this system far more
usable and enable better decision-making about how to redirect the project.
This proposed hybrid system also requires research into making forward-looking future
VSMs. One of the original goals of this research was to try to make such realistic
predictive maps, but due to changes in the research plan, this was abandoned. These
maps are not the same as the idealistic future state VSMs that are suggested by McManus
(2004). These maps would be realistic and based on the current state, but would be made
before a project's inception. As the project progresses the initial map could be compared
to subsequent versions of the map for future analysis. There has been little work done on
making predictive VSMs, and research into how to make them would prove valuable.
Perhaps existing IT systems could be leveraged to help make the VSMs from the WBSs.
This would require detailed research, but might even enable linkage to critical chain
analysis (which would further enable good project management). Further research should
be done in determining to how to easily make electronic PDVSMs, and how to tie this
software to that used for EVMS entry and tracking. Regardless of how one must go to get
to a future Lean state of product development and management, for now managers should
try to use VSMs to improve their EVMS usage.
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